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“It’s your city, only you can save it!”:  
Save Montreal’s Grassroots Opposition to Urban Redevelopment 
Eliot Perrin 
 Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the urban conservation group Save 
Montreal actively opposed the city’s high-modernist redevelopment.  To date, their 
efforts have been studied within the context of heritage preservation and its contribution 
to evolving notions of local identity.  While Save Montreal was undoubtedly concerned 
with the retention of structures considered historically significant its members did not 
characterize themselves as heritage preservationists.  Rather, I argue that Save 
Montreal’s membership constructed their organization and campaigned so as to 
challenge the means and process by which development occurred in the city centre.  My 
use of oral history as a primary method of analysis reveals the socio-economic and 
political motivations of the group while also serving to democratize urban history.  Oral 
history also represents a valuable means by which to understand and contextualize 
urban conservation movements.  While local in operation and outlook, Save Montreal’s 
1973-1985 activist period paralleled postwar grassroots conservation movements in 
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Adele – What really had an impact on me was when they destroyed the Van 
Horne mansion at the corner of Peel and Sherbrooke Street.  I remember that 
day very clearly in my mind.  I was on that street corner, with my son, and there 
was the big ball, and the house was coming down and I even picked up some 
kind of relic, I don’t know, it was a piece of stone or whatever, and I had it for a 
long time, I don’t know what I did with it.  And after that I said ‘There’s something 
wrong about that.  Why are they tearing down housing?  Why are they tearing 
down such beautiful houses, I just don’t understand.’1 
 
Adele Mardoche’s recollection of the destruction of the Van Horne mansion, 
which stood at the corner of Rues Stanley and Sherbrooke in Montreal’s wealthy Square 
Mile until it’s razing on the morning of September 8, 1973, reveals the shock and 
incomprehension of its loss.  Built in 1869, the eclectic greystone mansion was once the 
home of William Van Horne, former general manager and president of the Canadian 
Pacific Railway (CPR).  Replaced by a modernist office tower, the building was mourned 
by Adele and others who witnessed its demolition.  Decades later, the sense of loss 
remains audible in Adele’s voice and words.  For Adele it was unimaginable that a 
structure of such architectural allure, situated on one of Montreal’s most cherished 
streets, could be so wantonly destroyed.  There existed an apparent value gap between 
Adele and both those who committed the demolition or abetted the processes and 
climate in which this act could take place.  While this event was one of sorrow, this 
memory also serves as the foundation for Adele’s life of activism in downtown Montreal. 
I first encountered Adele in 2013 by happenstance while volunteering with a 
Heritage Montreal walking tour.  At the time I was contemplating my master’s application 
and how best to examine Montreal’s heritage preservation movements.  The tour guide, 
aware of Adele’s activism and my research interests, identified her as someone who had 
been previously involved with a group called Save Montreal, an organization then 
unfamiliar to me.  I introduced myself and was immediately introduced to another former 
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 Mardoche, Adele, interview with Eliot Perrin. Montreal, October 25, 2013. 
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member of the group, Jane Broderick, who was also taking the tour.  This meeting 
proved fortuitous as Save Montreal became my entry point into the history of Montreal’s 
preservation movement following the Van Horne mansion’s demolition. 
In the postwar years, government bodies throughout North America sought ways 
and means to arrest the social and economic decline of their inner cities.  Postwar 
suburbanization depopulated city centres of their residents, depleting the local tax base.2 
Overseas competition and greater automation put pressure on both manufacturers and 
their employees.  By the late 1960s, blue-collar jobs were in decline as factories quit the 
inner-city for suburban areas and other regions.3 Their solutions entailed the adoption of 
high-modernist principles pertaining to governance and urban development.  
Technocratic planning called for the rationalization of urban space and the segregation 
of land uses via zoning regulations.  These measures were achieved by adopting 
modern architectural forms that deliberately supplanted traditional streetscapes and 
patterns.4 Central to such principles was a robust belief that large-scale development 
correlated to socio-economic progress.5  As a result, North American cities, with 
state/provincial and federal support, underwent sweeping changes to their built form and 
Montreal was no exception. 
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 Suburban communities revealed class and racial divisions, fostering a growing alienation 
between geographic areas.  For an example of this process see: Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of 
the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1996). 
3
 For additional information on the impact of deindustrialization in North America see: Barry 
Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community 
Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1982) and 
Steven High, Industrial Sunset: The Making of North America’s Rust Belt, 1969-1984 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2003). 
4
 Modern architecture resists easy classification and styles evolved throughout the postwar 
period.  However, International style, new formalism, mid-century modern and brutalism are the 
styles that best define the era. 
5
 See Peter Hall’s Chapter “The City of Towers”: Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual 
History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century (Malden, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 218-261. 
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While Montreal’s previous era of development had been the result of economic 
prosperity, the postwar building boom was birthed in a time of economic uncertainty.6 
Industry was quitting the inner-city, part of a deindustrialization process occurring 
throughout the continent’s manufacturing heartlands.7  Historically working class 
neighbourhoods such as St-Henri and Pointe St-Charles witnessed the shuttering of 
factories, depriving the areas, and the city, of valuable jobs.8  The departure of industry 
was aided by the rapid expansion of automobile and truck usage and the implementation 
of automobile infrastructure networks, allowing manufacturers to opt for inexpensive 
greenfield sites outside of Montreal or even the province.9  Highway construction also 
impacted Montreal’s railway companies, who saw a decline in their fortunes as the 
automobile supplanted trains in the transportation of people and goods.  Their position 
would erode even further following the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959, 
whereby ocean-going vessels could bypass Montreal’s port altogether.10  Highway 
                                                 
6
 The 1880-1930 period represented the peak of Montreal’s economic prosperity.  Major 
construction projects during this time reflected the city’s affluence: Isabelle Gournay and France 
Vanlaethem, Montreal Metropolis, 1880-1930 (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing; Montreal: Canadian 
Centre for Architecture, 1998). 
7
 See chapter “The Deindustrializing Heartland,” Steven High, Industrial Sunset, 92-130. 
8
 The decline of manufacturing as a percentage of the Montreal workforce was from 37.6% of the 
population in 1951 to 30.65% of the population in 1971 to 20.06% of the population in 1981. 
Robert K. Whelan, “The Politics of Urban Redevelopment in Montreal: Regime Change from 
Drapeau to Doré,” Quebec Studies 12 (Spring/Summer 1991): 158. 
9
 Toronto’s economic ascendancy can be traced back to the 1930s when its stock market 
transactions overtook those of Montreal’s See David Ley, The New Middle-class and the 
Remaking of the Central City (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 144. Throughout 
subsequent decades, for a variety of reasons relating to continental economic trends and a 
westward population shift, Toronto overtook Montreal as the financial capital of Canada.  For 
further explanation of the circumstances behind this economic power shift: Paul-André Linteau, 
Histoire de Montréal depuis la Confédération (Les Editions du Boréal: Montreal, 2000), 429-432. 
Corresponding with Toronto’s economic ascendany was the departure of many Anglophone 
Montrealers.  Again, there are a number of factors that prompted Anglophones to decamp to 
other cities.  For more details on this subject see: Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos and Dominique 
Clift, The English Fact in Quebec (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1980), Martha 
Radice, Feeling Comfortable?: The Urban Experience of Anglo-Montrealers (Montreal: Les 
Presses De L’Université Laval, 2000) and Ronald Rudin, The Forgotten Quebecers: A History of 
English-Speaking Quebec 1759-1980 (Quebec: Institut québécois de recherce sur la culture, 
1985). 
10
 Montreal’s geography, as the furthest upriver oceangoing port, had been economically 
advantageous, benefiting the national rail companies (CPR, CNR) headquartered there.  The 
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construction proved an incentive for residents to move to newly erected housing in the 
West Island and off-island communities.11 The suburbanization of the greater Montreal 
area depleted inner-city neighbourhoods of residents and businesses, further damaging 
the city’s economy.12 
Aggravating this situation was the abject state of the city’s housing stock.  The 
Great Depression and the wartime diversion of housing materials resulted in severely 
deteriorated homes throughout much of the city.  By the mid-1940’s federal authorities 
recognized that, of the 25 largest Canadian municipalities, Montreal’s housing needs 
were the greatest.13 While housing construction was aggressive in the immediate 
postwar years, new units were often constructed in increasingly suburban areas and 
economically out of reach for much of the city’s working class. The result was a growing 
segregation between the burgeoning wealthy suburban areas and the city centre.14 
Equally alarming for many Montrealers were the illicit activities associated with inner-city 
neighbourhoods.  Lurid stories of sexual and criminal transgressions in dilapidated 
tenements contributed to the development of an urban renewal narrative propagated by 
media outlets and local authorities.15 The civic corruption that stemmed from gambling 
and other forms of vice occasioned a legal confrontation in which Jean Drapeau, an anti-
                                                                                                                                                 
opening of the Seaway eliminated this national advantage and undermined the city’s prominent 
rail industry: Linteau, Histoire de Montréal, 436-440. 
11
 Montreal’s suburban area grew rapidly in the postwar era.  Between 1951-1971, the suburban 
region’s population grew by 258% while Montreal’s only grew by 48%: Yves Bussière, 
“L’automobile et l’expansion des banlieues: le cas de Montréal, 1901-2001,” Urban History 
Review 18.2 (1989): 161. 
12
 For a more detailed overview, see André Lortie’s chapter “Montreal 1960: The Singularities of a 
Metropolitan Archetype,” in The 60s: Montreal Thinks Big, ed. André Lortie (Vancouver: Douglas 
& McIntyre, 2004), 75-142. 
13
 The wartime Department of Reconstruction determined that Montreal required 16,400 dwellings 
immediately and another 50,000 over the course of the next five years: Marc H. Choko, Les 
Habitations Jeanne-Mance: Un Projet Social Au Centre-ville (Montreal: Editions Saint-Martin, 
1995), 29. 
14
 Catherine Charlesbois and Paul-André Linteau, Quartiers Disparus: Red Light, Faubourg À 
M’Lasse, Goose Village (Montreal: Les Éditions Cardinal inc., 2014), 40. 
15
 Will Straw, “Montreal and The Captive City.” Quebec Studies 48 (Fall 2009/Winter 2010): 18. 
 For an in depth examination of the prolificacy of gambling in Montreal see: Magaly Brodeur, Vice 
et corruption à Montréal 1892-1970 (Quebec: Presses de l'Université du Québec, 2011). 
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corruption prosecutor, emerged as a name in municipal affairs.  His work as member of 
the Comité de moralité publique propelled Drapeau to electoral victory.  As Mayor, 
Drapeau became one of the key individuals responsible for Montreal’s civic 
remodelling.16  
The bulk of Drapeau’s mayoralty was characterized by an adherence to 
modernist principles dating back to the turn of the century.17  Earlier planning visionaries 
like Le Corbusier and Siegfried Giedion promoted urban renewal as a means to rectify 
societal ills considered inherent to existing cityscapes.  They perceived the nineteenth-
century industrial city to be an agent of chaos and incongruity, responsible for 
engendering crime and squalor.  In response, they called for the demolition of city 
centres in favour of a rational street grid comprised of repeating high-rises, surrounded 
by green spaces.  High-density living spaces were considered necessary in order to 
liberate cities from their excessive congestion.18 Their form of modernism was 
considered progressive in nature and proved to be a powerful influence on the 
development schemes adopted in many jurisdictions on both sides of the Atlantic during 
the postwar period. 
Armed with Keynesian economic reasoning, governments utilized high-modernist 
philosophy a means of rectifying the economic ills facing the continent’s cities as a result 
of deindustrialization, suburbanization and disinvestment.  According to James Scott, 
“high-modernist ideology” can be described as  
                                                 
16
 Brodeur, Vice et corruption, 49-59. 
17
 Drapeau was not atypical of municipal politicians during this era.  City planning in New York 
City and Toronto were also dominated by forceful personalities (Robert Moses and Frederick 
Gardiner, respectively) who articulated a modernist approach to urban renewal and transportation 
policy.  See: Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1975) and Timothy J. Colton, Big Daddy: Frederick G. Gardiner and the 
Building of Metropolitan Toronto (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980). 
18
 See: Jon Caulfield, City Form and Everyday Life: Toronto’s Gentrification and Critical Social 
Practice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 1994), 52 and Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 222. 
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a strong, one might even say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about 
scientific and technical progress, the expansion of production, the growing 
satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature (including human nature), 
and, above all, the rational design of social order commensurate with the 
scientific understanding of the natural laws.19 
 
Utopian in its outlook, high-modernism believed that society is best governed by a 
centralized, technocratic state.  Society’s ills could be rectified by the widespread, 
indiscriminate application of standardized policy.  This mentality informed architects and 
urban planners who believed that the replacement of aging inner-city districts with sleek, 
functionalist housing and office blocks was beneficial to the economic and social health 
of the area and its residents.  The application of strict zoning ordinances and widespread 
private automobility were also understood as necessary in the creation of a highly-
ordered, utilitarian city.20  
In Montreal, high-modernist thinking contributed to a series of “Grand projets” 
that typified development throughout the Drapeau era.21 Massive in scale, their forms 
boldly broke from existing streetscapes and local architecture, drastically reshaping the 
city and how it functioned.   These “megastructures, “a symbol of the optimism of large-
scale thinking”, were “broadly imagined to be a flexible framework that enclosed the 
functions of a city, thereby making immanent new forms of human interaction, social 
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 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 4. The terms “modernist” and “high-modernist” are often used 
interchangeably.  I will be using “high-modernist” throughout this paper as it best summarizes the 
degree to which Montreal was being redeveloped as well as reflecting the undemocratic manner 
in which municipal politics were conducted throughout the time period under discussion. 
20
 Peter Blake’s Form Follows Fiasco, offers an issue-by-issue examination and response to the 
principles of modernist planning and architecture, and serves as an excellent overview for the 
subject.  While the work is admittedly biased, Blake was originally a proponent of modernist forms 
before further analysis convinced him of the misguidedness of this philosophy. See: Peter Blake,  
Form Follows Fiasco: Why Modern Architecture Hasn’t Worked (Toronto: Little, Brown & 
Company, 1977). 
21
 Some examples include Place des Arts, the Palais des Congrès, the Hydro-Québec 
headquarters, and the Université du Québec à Montréal campus. 
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control and the technical organization of space.”22 Place Ville-Marie was, perhaps, the 
building that most emblemized this era.  Its strikingly modern cruciform structure housed 
corporate offices, while its base contained a shopping concourse with links to 
surrounding businesses and transportation.  The interiorization of city life represented a  
 
Illustration 1.1: Map of downtown Montreal that demonstrates the areas 
north and west of the Old City that were targeted for development in the postwar 
period.23 
 
further privatization of consumption patterns and one that would be replicated in other 
buildings and the expansion of indoor/underground shopping.24 Furthermore, Place Ville-
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 Inderbir Singh Riar, “Montreal and the Megastructure, ca 1967,” edited by Rhona Richman 
Kenneally and Johanne Sloan, Expo 67: Not Just a Souvenir (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2010): 193. 
23
 Clément Demers,  “Le nouveau centre-ville de Montréal.” Cahiers de géographie du Québec 
27.71 (1983): 213. 
24
 Don Nerbas provides an excellent historical overview of Place Ville-Marie, highlighting the 
impact the building had on the city and the manner in which it corresponded to nationalist, 
modernist and capitalist ambitions for Montreal’s urban centre. Don Nerbas, “William Zeckendorf, 
Place Ville-Marie and the Making of Modern Montreal,” Urban History Review 43.2 (2015): 5-25. 
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Marie corresponded to a reorientation of Montreal’s business district away from the old 
city.  The previously low-density Square Mile would soon play host to a wide array of 
construction projects, immense in footprint and initiated by both government bodies and 
private interest groups.25  As will be elaborated upon later in this thesis, the 
developmental pressure that resulted from these developments carried significant 
implications for buildings and streetscapes in this area.  
In accordance with their high-modernist philosophy, automobility preoccupied 
governmental authorities during this time, resulting in a series of road widenings and the 
construction of vast networks of urban expressways.  Such measures were considered 
necessary for relieving congestion in urban centres.  Early projects such as the widening 
of Dorchester Boulevard stemmed from a desire to improve auto circulation both within 
the city and for commuters arriving from the suburbs.26 The announcement of Montreal’s 
hosting of Expo 67 in the early 1960s prompted authorities to “set into motion a surge of 
new construction and the completion of roadwork aimed at making Montreal a modern, 
world-class metropolis.”27 In the six years prior to Expo, the city dedicated almost half of 
its capital expenditures to improving the city’s automobile infrastructure.28  Further 
                                                                                                                                                 
The construction of the Montreal Metro also contributed to the interiorization of Montreal’s 
downtown business and retail sectors.  Metro stations provided “developmental potential” as 
“direct links…would ensure a captive public and a high economic return.” See: Bruce Anderson, 
“Making the City More Useable: an evaluation of weather protected public spaces in Montreal,” 
JAE 29.3 (1976): 20-22. 
25
 Since 1941, the city’s Service de l’urbanisme delinated the business district boundaries several 
times in subsequent decades.  By 1982, the district would correspond roughly to Rue Atwater, 
Avenue Des Pins, Rue Amherst, the river and the CP tracks immediately west of Rue Guy. See 
Demers, “Le nouveau centre-ville,” 209-235. 
26
 The widening of Dorchester Boulevard (now Boulevard René-Lévesque) was the first instance 
of circulation-related measures undertaken.  It would be followed by the construction of Boulevard 
de Maisonneuve, Avenue Docteur-Penfield, the Autoroute Ville-Marie, the Autoroute Décarie and 
the Autoroute 25.   
27
 Claire Poitras, “A City on the Move: The Surprising Consequences of Highways,” 
in Metropolitan Natures: Environmental Histories of Montreal (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2011), 171. 
28
 Harold Kaplan, Reform, Planning, and City Politics: Montreal, Winnipeg, Toronto (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1982), 425. 
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support in the way of provincial and federal government subsidies resulted in a 
latticework of expressways across the island.  
The aforementioned architectural forms also articulated a burgeoning confidence 
felt by French-Canadians, and were considered complimentary to the 
modernization/nationalization campaigns then underway as part of the Quiet 
Revolution.29  Massive complexes for crown corporations were constructed to house the 
rapidly expanding civil service.  Offices for Hydro-Québec and Radio-Canada became 
physical manifestations of the upward mobility of French Quebec that the Quiet 
Revolution promised.30   
However, despite the fanfare surrounding these large-scale projects, they failed 
to have the intended economic effect and proved to be more panacea than remedy.  As 
sociologists Annick Germain and Damarais Rose note: the rationalization of “urban 
space for production, circulation and consumption for a newly emerging reconfigured 
corporate society is highly problematic and expensive” and required “the costly 
destruction and reconstruction of the city’s physical infrastructure.”31 Unlike the 
structures that replaced them, the vast majority of buildings demolished were 
residences.32 The construction of the Autoroute Ville-Marie alone required the demolition 
of 3,000 homes, the relocation of 15,000 residents and a disruption of the lives of 
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 The advent of the Quiet Revolution coincided with the election of Quebec Liberal Party in 1960, 
with Jean Lesage as premier.  During this period the provincial government assumed a greater 
role in the provision of health care and education, while expanding the civil service immensely. 
30
 Lortie, “Montreal 1960,” 104. 
31
 Annick Germain and Damaris Rose, Montréal: The Quest for a Metropolis (Chichester, West 
Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2000), 66. 
32
 Francine Dansereau and Peter Foggin estimate that of the buildings demolished in Montreal 
(1964-1971) between 80% and 90% were residences.  Francine Dansereau and Peter Foggin, 
Quelques aspects du développment spatial de l’agglomération Montréalaise (Montreal: Institut 
national de la recherché scientifique,1976), 42.  Drapeau often dismissed these homes as “les 
taudis” and a blight upon Montreal’s landscape that needed to be removed: Martin Drouin, “De la 




147,000 people.33 By depleting surrounding areas of their buildings and residents, these 
structures further damaged an already suffering local economy and caused distress to 
both those evicted and those who lost their source of income.34   
Although residents initially shared the city and provincial government’s 
enthusiasm for these projects, by the late 1960s ongoing demolitions and dislocation 
contributed to a growing opposition to the modernist philosophy shaping public policy 
and Drapeau’s style of governance.  While Drapeau often characterized his behaviour as 
acting in the interests of the citizenry, in reality his administration suffered from the 
centralization of power and an absence of elected opposition.  His propensity for 
sweeping remedies for societal ills revealed the “deeply authoritarian” nature often 
attributed to high modernist disciples.35 
Local socio-political opposition manifested itself in neighbourhoods most 
threatened by Montreal’s developmental aim, specifically in areas that ringed the 
downtown area, both to the west (Little Burgundy, Saint-Henri and Pointe Saint-Charles) 
and to the east (Centre-Sud and Hochelaga).  In addition to the developmental pressure 
facing each neighbourhood, these areas also suffered from the poor delivery of social 
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 Poitras, City on the Move, 176. 
34
 Chan Kwok Bun, Smoke and Fire: The Chinese in Montreal (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1991), 293.  
35
 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 94. Under Drapeau, city committee 
meetings were frequently conducted by telephone, public consultation was nonexistent and 
developers often met privately with the mayor.  Public policy stemmed the executive council, 
where council candidates were handpicked by the mayor, “a fact which ranks him among the 
most powerful of urban political figures and which contributed to his ability to treat Montreal as 
little more than a site for his personal dreams of glory.”: Timothy Lloyd Thomas, A City with a 
Difference: The Rise and Fall of the Montreal Citizen’s Movement (Montreal: Véhicule Press, 
1997), 23-24.  By 1970, civic opposition to Drapeau had coalesced under the Front d’action 
publique (FRAP) banner.  However, FRAP became a political casualty of the October Crisis as 
Drapeau effectively painted as them as Front de libération national sympathizers, winning the 
subsequent election: Dominique Clément, “The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses 
Under the War Measures Act,” Journal of Canadian Studies 42.2 (2008): 170.   
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services.  Responding to local needs, organizations were often formed to provide legal, 
medical, or social services considered lacking or unavailable.36 
Elsewhere in the city, activist groups formed in opposition to specific direct 
threats to their neighbourhoods.  Plans for a massive office-hotel complex dubbed La 
Cité that required the demolition of 25-acre residential area centered on Rue du Parc, for 
example, triggered the formation of the Milton-Parc Citizens’ Committee and led to a 
protracted struggle.37 The construction of the east-west Autoroute Ville-Marie likewise 
elicited vociferous local opposition, with critics citing the needless destruction of housing 
and the deterioration of air quality as major concerns.  Furthermore, the lack of public 
consultation was a major source of grievance for locals.  The expressway’s proposed 
route, from Westmount to Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, united Anglophone and 
Francophone residents in their opposition.38 
This neighbourhood-lead opposition to modernist planning echoed those 
transpiring in other North American cities, most often in response to expressway 
construction, and the demolitions they entailed.  Since 1959, activists in San Francisco 
had routinely opposed cross-town expressway plans, leading to their eventual 
                                                 
36
 Such groups formed in the Sud-Ouest neighbourhoods as early as 1963.  Often their aim was 
to improve upon already existing services and they operated in conjunction with established 
government or church-lead organizations. Local groups in the Centre-Sud and Hochelaga 
emerged in the late 1960s and often sought to establish their own social services, separate from 
the state.  Areas such as these were often targeted for widespread demolition as a result of the 
preponderance of aged housing and the fact they were often home to lower-income residents: 
Donald McGraw, Le développement des groupes populaires à Montréal (1963-1973) (Montreal: 
Université du Québec à Montréal, 1978), 13-15. 
37
 The Milton-Parc Citizens’ Committee was founded in 1968 and, like groups in other 
neighbourhoods, also worked to provide services to local residents.  For a more detailed 
explanation of the group and the events leading to the creation of the Milton-Parc housing co-
operative see Claire Helman, The Milton-Park Affair: Canada's Largest Citizen-Developer 
Confrontation (Montreal: Véhiculre Press, 1987) or Lucia Kowaluk and Carolle Piché-Burton, 
Communauté Milton-Parc: L’histoire d’hier et le fonctionnement d’aujourd’hui (Montreal: 
Communauté Milton-Parc, 2012). 
38
 Valérie Poirier, “L’autoroute est-ouest, c’est pas le progrès!”: enviornnement et mobilisation 
cityoenne en opposition au projet d’autoroute est-ouest à Montréal en 1971,” Bulletin d’histoire 
politique 23.2 (2015): 67-70. 
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cancellation.39 Throughout the 1960s residents of New York’s West Village 
neighbourhood assailed the proposed Lower Manhattan Expressway.40  In Toronto, 
residents stalled plans for the Spadina Expressway which would have cleaved a series 
of inner-city neighbourhoods in two.41  
By 1973, these local neighbourhood struggles coalesced into a city-wide 
preservationist movement under the banner of Save Montreal.  Calling for the cessation 
of demolitions and elimination of green spaces, the group advocated for a transformation 
in the manner that development was realized in the urban core.  The adoption of 
planning guidelines was considered the means to achieve this while also democratizing 
the planning process.  
The response of Save Montreal, and other groups and residents, to postwar 
high-modernist planning stands can be viewed through two lenses.  The first is an 
offshoot of the wide-ranging grassroots political and social movement often categorized 
as the New Left.  Secondly, community activism has been understood as an 
aesthetic/architectural rejection of modernist forms in favour of those more closely 
associated with everyday usage and the vernacular. 
 
The New Left and Grassroots Community Activism 
 
 As noted earlier, high-modernist disciples regarded the redevelopment and 
rationalization of urban space as necessary for socio-economic prosperity.  The 
imposition of massive forms in North American city centres was initially welcomed but 
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 See William Issel, “Land Values, Human Values, and the Preservation of the City’s Treasured 
Appearance’: Environmentalism, Politics, and the San Francisco Freeway Revolt,” Pacific 
Historical Review 68.4 (1999): 611-646. 
40
 Alice Sparberg Alexiou, Jane Jacobs: Urban Visionary (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers Ltd., 
2006), 107-134. 
41
 The Spadina Expressway was eventually permanently cancelled by Ontario Premier Bill Davis 
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would eventually be met with criticism from many inner-city residents.  An early, and 
perhaps most influential, critic of urban renewal policies was Jane Jacobs.  As a result of 
her involvement with the grassroots contestation of urban redevelopment in Lower 
Manhattan, she penned The Death and Life of Great American Cities, a book that would 
prove hugely influential to urban planning and local politics.  Jacobs’ concluded that 
large-scale redevelopment projects were ruinous to the behaviours and patterns that 
made cities successful in the first place.  Existing streetscapes and the aged buildings 
that populated them were important for the livelihood of both residents and small 
businesses.42  Furthermore, Christopher Klemek surmises that what was possibly most 
galling to Jacobs and her fellow activists was that urban renewal “was fundamentally 
tyrannical in its concentration of power and undemocratic in its application.”43 Absent 
from municipal plans at the time was any consultation from the very people who were to 
be most disrupted by civic redevelopment proposals.  In subsequent years, Jacobs’ 
philosophy has been criticized by some scholars for her commodification of aged 
buildings.44 Nonetheless, her anti-bureaucratic, resident-oriented contestation of state-
sponsored redevelopment projects was emblematic of a growing form of urban-centered 
activism that came to be designated as the New Left. 
Appearing during the 1960s, the New Left entailed a rejection of the postwar 
“bureaucratic societies” that were considered responsible for stifling democratic 
initiatives45 as well as political parties traditionally associated with the left.46 Activist 
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groups that held New Left principles spurned formal structures, instead demanding “a 
new politics of resistance founded on authentic emancipation and human freedom, a 
‘socialism’ of self-management, anti-imperialism, and direct democracy.”47 The 
movement was distinctly urban in nature and its activists believed that cities provided the 
milieu in which “to construct a counter-modernity, an alternative society in which citizens 
would be able to control the forces that shaped their lives.”[Italics his]48 
Scholarly discussions of the New Left in Canada consider Montreal as the locus 
of New Leftist thought and activity in the country.  Sean Mills notes how worldwide 
decolonization movements shaped and inspired New Leftst ideas in the city, helping 
make the city into a prominent centre for Black consciousness and feminist thought.49 
These postcolonial conversations, Ian McKay argues, contributed to the growing 
nationalist movement as activists increasingly viewed English Canada and the United 
States as purveyors of capitalist domination.50  Despite the apparent effervescence of 
Montreal’s leftist community, these debates consider the movement fleeting, with Bryan 
Palmer arguing that by the end of the 1960s the movement imploded thanks to factional 
infighting.51              
Discussion of 1970s activism tends to focus on overall trends amongst 
community organizations.  Mills, Jacques Godbout and Jean-Pierre Collin contend that 
leftist activists and the labour movement grew more militant during the 1970s, becoming 
increasingly associated with Marxist and Maoist schools of thought.52 Henri Lustiger-
Thaler and Eric Shragge explain that by the late 1970s community groups experienced a 
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growing degree of institutionalization once they received provincial funding for service 
provision, a trend that would lead towards an increasingly narrow organizational focus in 
later decades.53 While these studies provide an adequate overview, their analysis 
overlooks community groups that resist such classification. 
Political factors also influenced the outlook and behaviour of community activism 
during this period.  Disappointment regarding ongoing economic inequalities in Quebec 
pushed governmental bodies and non-state actors towards a more stringently nationalist 
position.54 This outlook would also inform the provincial government’s development of 
cultural policy, while influencing how built forms were interpreted in Quebec.55 
 
Changing Relations to Built Form  
As noted by scholars, the recognition and preservation of built structures is 
charged with symbolism.  Since the late nineteenth-century, the commemoration of 
buildings and sites has been utilized by governing bodies as a means of fostering a 
cohesive nationalist sentiment throughout Europe and North America.56 This 
interpretation of heritage sites resembles Maurice Halbwachs conclusions regarding 
social memory.  Halbwachs argues that an individual’s recollections are contiguous on 
their perpetual reconstruction within the greater community.  However, such a 
reconstruction is not an act of passivity; the maintenance of a distinct social memory 
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requires the ongoing erasure of all that might fragment or distance the constituent 
groups from one another.57 The result of state-sponsored heritage commemoration is the 
creation of a built memory infrastructure, a means by which to remember the past 
(keeping in mind that such remembrance is a form of interpretation) and guiding our 
present understandings of place and identity.  
In the case of Quebec, scholars have argued that relations to built heritage are 
enmeshed with concerns and rivalries between the linguistic communities.  The 
competing duality of English and French Montreal fostered a climate in which each 
cultural community interpreted their urban area by means of their own distinct read of the 
city’s history.  As historian Alan Gordon notes, throughout the first decades of the 
twentieth-century, monuments were erected commemorating people deemed to be of 
local, regional or national significance.  The historical actors selected for 
commemoration by each linguistic community emphasized differing periods or events as 
foundational, or contributing, to each group’s collective memory.58 Such conceptions of 
built heritage remained interwoven with notions of national identity in postwar Quebec.  
Addressing the development of provincial heritage sites in the Quebec City area, Patrice 
Groulx and Alain Roy highlight the divergent aims of provincial and federal cultural 
policy.  While the federal government designated buildings it considered representative 
of the development of Canada, the Quebec government increasingly viewed heritage 
sites as a method by which to cultivate the Québécois nation.59  
However, by the late 1960s, contemporary scholars argued that identity was less 
enmeshed with national memory infrastructure and increasingly invested in one’s locality 
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or community.  This outlook was congruous with the anti-structural positions prominent 
with individuals and groups associated with the New Left.  Furthermore, this community 
emphasis also contested the forward-looking structural redevelopment of many North 
American cities.  In the case of Montreal, early critiques by architecture scholars, such 
as Melvin Charney and Jean-Claude Marsan, rejected modernism’s institutionalized 
forms.  They believed that architecture was not simply an aesthetic movement but one 
with an implicitly social element.  Whereas governing bodies celebrated the new and the 
grandiose, Charney and Marsan praised the built vernacular which they felt to be the 
clearest representation of both a people and their place.60 Jean-Claude Marsan, himself 
a former member of Save Montreal, considered this new concept, “l’idéologie de la 
réappropriation”, an ideology characterized by a rediscovery of values and the 
neighbourhood life that nurtured them.  These values, Marsan notes, stem from a 
concern for the physiological and psychological needs of the populace.  Such needs 
represent a diverse array of tangible and intangible requirements from clean air and 
security, to personal happiness in their urban space.61  
The first manifestation of this new ideology was the formation of neighbourhood 
advocacy and urban conservation groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s.62 According 
to Luc Noppen, Lucie Morisset and Martin Drouin the result of these conservationist 
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groups was the formation of a specifically “Montreal identity” rooted in a previously 
ignored built environment, what Drouin labels the “Victorian city”, an area of the city 
composed of 19th century buildings and architecture beyond the limits of “Ville-Marie” (or 
“Old Montreal”).  Furthermore, by attaching local identity to this area, conservationists 
were also rejecting the “City of Progress” viewpoint then adopted by Mayor Jean 
Drapeau and Montreal’s city government.63   
Like many of their contemporaries, it was in this milieu that Save Montreal 
operated.  As a result, Noppen and Morisset argue that Save Montreal “eurent un impact 
essentiel sur la conceptualisation de l’identité montréalaise”.64 Drouin, in his examination 
of Montreal’s heritage preservation movements, Le combat du patrimoine à Montréal 
(1973-2003), also considers Save Montreal to be one of the organizations principally 
responsible for nurturing this shift in local identity.65  While these works aptly situate 
Save Montreal into a broader discussion regarding the changing relationships between 
community, identity, and built heritage, they nonetheless represent a teleological 
analysis.  As a result, Save Montreal’s other principles and objectives are discussed only 
peripherally.66 While Save Montreal was undoubtedly concerned with the preservation of 
built heritage, it was far from being the group’s only concern.  Rather, the group’s wide-
ranging concerns and goals prevent the organization from being classified in any 
singular manner.  Save Montreal exists at the intersection of local identity and New Left-
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inspired ideals that combined to create a group whose disposition included both the 
safeguarding of the past and the advocation of a more equitable present. 
 This thesis will undertake a detailed survey of Save Montreal and its campaigns 
throughout the years 1973-1985, calling special attention to the personal stories behind 
the group and the campaigns in which they were engaged.  Conversations with former 
members reveal specificities and positions that are not necessarily reflected in the 
documentary evidence.  In studying the inner-city resettlement of Toronto 
neighbourhoods, Jon Caulfield explored the “efforts by human beings to resist 
institutionalized patterns of dominance and suppressed possibility and create new 
conditions for their social activities.”67  In a similar fashion, an oral history analysis 
reveals that Save Montreal’s membership constructed their organization and 
campaigned so as to challenge the means and process by which development occurred 
in their city centre.  This constituted a rejection of the city’s high-modernist philosophy 
and the democratic deficit in civic affairs.  While Save Montreal undoubtedly contributed 
to an evolving Montreal identity, the group’s abiding interest in the economic impact of 
development, and ongoing demands for citizen participation in the planning process, 
highlight a group not only concerned with its city’s past, but also for its future.  In 
addition, throughout this paper I will situate the group within the broader North American 
context.  While Save Montreal was grappling with government bodies specific to its 
locality, the group is nonetheless part of a transnational trend in which urban high-
modernist practices were being challenged by other grassroots movements. 
In profiling Save Montreal and its campaigns in greater detail, I am seeking to 
contribute to the study of urban conservation in Canada in general and Montreal in 
particular.  As described earlier, the historiography of urban conservation in Montreal 
remains limited and most studies conceptualize debates over heritage preservation as 
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part of a broader contestation over local identity.  In highlighting the political-economic 
considerations inherent to Save Montreal’s activism, my paper seeks to help elucidate a 
dimension of Montreal’s urban conservation discussions that has been somewhat 
overlooked.  Furthermore, studies of Quebec activism have tended to concentrate on the 
growing radicalization of leftist/labour groups in the province during the 1970s, 
accentuating their Marxist/Maoist outlook.68 Groups that eschewed this degree of 
militancy have received less study or remain absent from discussion altogether.  
Furthermore, pan-Canadian investigations of 1970s urban reform generally place 
greater emphasis on Toronto in their studies. 69 The electoral success of reform-minded 
politicians in the 1970s makes the city a useful example of the institutionalization of 
urban conservationist ideas.  As a result, Montreal’s anti-urban renewal activism is often 
neglected.  This thesis seeks to broaden this discussion so as to situate Montreal in this 
conversation, better revealing it as a forum for conservationist debate.  This is especially 
pertinent seeing as some of the buildings Save Montreal successfully campaigned for 
are considered to be of national significance.70  
In demanding reforms to the urban planning process Save Montreal understood 
public participation to be a means of democratizing inner-city development.  Considering 
the group’s position, this thesis will also contribute to historical discussions of North 
American urban planning.71 The positionality of public responses to postwar urban 
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change is central to planning history conversations.72 Debates over the methods and 
mentalities of local opposition to development projects are incredibly relevant given that 
the means used to achieve effective participatory planning remains unresolved.73    
In conversation, some of the Save Montrealers pondered their potential role in 
gentrifying the inner-city.  Scholars have argued that the preservation of built heritage 
has not been the precursor for sustainable community building but rather a contributing 
factor to the ongoing displacement of inner-city residents.74  Considering this, the impact 
of grassroots conservationist organizations on the gentrification of Montreal’s central 
neighbourhoods requires further exploration. 
This thesis utilizes publications produced by Save Montreal during the years in 
which it was primarily active (1973-1985), namely the organization’s central publication 
SOS Montreal as well as press releases relating to the city’s housing crisis.75  
Correlating newspaper articles relating to specific civic addresses were accessed at the 
Archives de Montréal.76 In effect, this material acted as the public face of the 
organization and the means by which the group most effectively communicated its 
positions.  Coupled with the newspaper articles penned by and about Save Montreal, 
they form the bulk of the known documentary material.  However, considering that many 
                                                 
72
 Recent examples include Issel, “Land Values, Human Values”, Gregory L. Thompson, “Taming 
the Neighborhood Revolution: Planners, Power Brokers, and the Birth of Neotraditionalism in 
Portland, Oregon,” Journal of Planning History 6.3 (2007): 214-247 and Christopher W. Wells, 
“From Freeway to Parkway: Federal Law, Grassroots Environmental Protest, and the Evolving 
Design of Interstate-35E in Saint Paul, Minnesota,” Journal of Planning History 11.1 (2012): 8-26.  
73
 Public participation in local planning processes often exists as token gestures, whereby 
residents are legally notified about projects, but are offered little opportunity to comment or 
critique, leaving many frustrated and alienated.  Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher argue that 
public participation needs to be a highly collaborative effort that encourages local stakeholders to 
dialogue throughout the process creating an environment in which projects can thoughtfully 
mature: Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher, “Reframing public participation: strategies for the 
21
st
 century,” Planning Theory & Practice 5.4 (December 2004): 419-436. 
74
 See Andrew Hurley, Beyond Preservation: Using Public History to Revitalize Inner Cities 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press: 2010) and Sharon Zukin, Loft Living: Culture and Capital 
in Urban Change (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1982). 
75
 SOS Montreal was published (either monthly or quarterly) throughout 1976-1982. 
76
 The civic addresses consulted were related to the Van Horne mansion and campaign sites. 
  
22 
Save Montrealers still reside within the city, it was imperative to speak with them.  
Conversations revealed a greater complexity to the group than that contained strictly in 
the written material. 
As a result oral history sources form the primary research for this thesis, 
specifically twenty interviews with sixteen former members of Save Montreal.77  
Interviewees were identified primarily through word of mouth.  In some cases, individuals 
could not be reached as their available contact information was out of date.  Sadly, 
another individual with whom I had been in contact passed away suddenly before we 
could speak in person.  The interviews concentrated on the members’ reasons for joining 
Save Montreal, their reactions to local urban change, the conservation campaigns they 
participated in, and personal reflections regarding the group’s perceived impact on 
residents evolving mentalities. These oral history interviews fill a crucial gap in the study 
of heritage preservation in Montreal.  As Steven High observes, “As an oral historian, I 
believe it is essential that we try to understand the ways in which people define 
themselves.”78 Furthermore, I feel that oral history's aim of widening the circle of 
historical enquiry is especially appropriate given the grassroots, non-hierarchical ethos 
of Save Montreal.   
When conducting oral history it is necessary to reflect upon one’s role in the 
interview process.  Self-reflexivity provides the opportunity to identify the power 
dynamics that are often at play when conducting oral history interviews. As Alan Wong 
writes, “being reflexive reminds oral history practitioners of their own positionality at all 
times relative to the narrator and, thus, helps keep the power balanced between those 
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on both sides of the table.”79 Considering the non-hierarchial structure adopted by Save 
Montreal, it was crucial to share authority with the participants as much as possible.  
I took the time to introduce such concepts as “shared authority” with my interview 
partners, and explained that while I may be the author, the story I was telling was theirs.  
With each interview, I became further convinced of the need to allow the interviewee to 
guide the interview as they saw fit.  Questions were prepared in advance but often my 
standard opening question would be the only one utilized.  Instead, the interviewees 
became as much, if not more, of a guide as I was.  Another means by which I sought to 
share authority was through my analysis of conservation campaigns.  Save Montreal’s 
organizational structure allowed its members to conduct simultaneous campaigns.  As a 
result, the group’s activism was prolific.  It was necessary to hone my focus.  The 
campaigns examined in this thesis were selected due to the importance accorded to 
them by the Save Montrealers.  While I originally had ideas regarding which campaigns 
would be the focus of this paper, the interviews altered this plan and I adjusted my focus. 
The devolution of power and authority in the interview process was also attained 
by establishing friendships with the interviewees.  As Lisa Tillman-Healy writes, 
friendship can be an important element in oral history fieldwork, the method by which 
researchers “gain entrée” to their sources.80 However, while the closeness and proximity 
I felt with the Save Montrealers undoubtedly helped the research creation process, it 
brought about other concerns, specifically related to what Valerie Yow describes as 
“unconscious advocacy”, a scenario in which the researcher becomes “too greatly 
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affected by” their “respect for an institution in the public presentation of the oral history 
evidence.”81 Personal experiences provided a means of identifying with the members of 
Save Montreal and their campaigns.  My parents participated in successful heritage 
campaigns in Oakville, Ontario where I grew up.  As a result, heritage preservation and 
urban conservation were a frequent topic of conversation growing up.  My earliest 
political letter writings were to Oakville’s mayor regarding buildings under threat.  It was 
no surprise that I chose this topic for my thesis and that I, for the most part, aligned 
socially and politically with the Save Montrealers.  As the project took shape and I 
became further embedded in my research, I became increasingly attached to both the 
project and the individuals who made this project possible.  I was fortunate to not only 
have gained access to a wealth of knowledge and information but also to have created 
friendships along the way. 
And yet, when writing a thesis utilizing oral history, there exists a power 
imbalance; namely I, the author, have access to the words of others in formulating an 
argument of my deducing.  Despite attempts throughout the interview process to share 
authority with the participants, there remains an asymmetry of which I am the 
beneficiary.  As a result, I have decided to integrate self-composed poems at the outset 
of each chapter and thesis conclusion.  Writing poetry represents an opportunity to share 
authority with one's reader since the medium often leaves the subject matter open to 
interpretation.  In this way, the reader is invested with a degree of power and authority 
as they are free to construe the meaning of each piece.  In addition, considering the 
democratic principles advocated by Save Montreal, I felt it important to at least 
disadvantage my position somewhat in creating this thesis.   
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  While each piece differs in form, the poems will focus on both my role in the 
research process as well as one’s relationship to our built heritage.  I must acknowledge 
the central influence that the poet Dennis Lee had on these poems, as his writings on 
the urban environment have been a source of ongoing inspiration.82 Further explanation 
of the poems is deliberately avoided, impelling the reader to consider the pieces 
independently and thereby derive their own conclusions. 
 The following chapters scrutinize Save Montreal and its campaigns with oral 
history excerpts serving as both a guide and object of analysis.  While Save Montreal’s 
activities have been documented to a degree,83 oral testimony provides a heretofore 
unutilized means by which to examine the group during its activist phase.84 More 
specifically, chapter one focuses on the formation of Save Montreal as a result of 
changing attitudes amongst those Montreal residents dismayed by the demolitions 
affecting the city centre.  Save Montreal’s membership, their reasons for joining the 
urban conservation movement and the non-hierarchial structure adopted by the group 
are examined in this chapter.  
Chapter two turns to the campaigns undertaken by Save Montreal as well as its 
use of walking tours to educate residents of the city’s built heritage.  This profile reveals 
the diversity (in architecture, proportions and cultural provenance) of structures targeted 
for demolition, showcasing the extent and arbitrariness by which central Montreal was 
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being developed.  The details of the proposed redevelopments may have differed but 
Save Montreal’s response was consistent in arguing for a more gradual and consultative 
planning process.  Furthermore, the manner by which Save Montreal responded to these 
plans reveals the organization’s multifacetedness. Confrontations over the city’s built 
environment cannot simply be reduced to debates over heritage and aesthetics.  While 
Save Montreal utilized these arguments, they also employed a range of strategies and 
responses to reveal the social and economic impact that demolitions and modernist 






































Chapter One: Formation of Save Montreal 
 
Not for the first time, I ask: am I interlocutor or interloper? 
These pages, carefully curated language,  
Privilege me, the discipline in which I ply 
The ensuing remarks mine but 
Their scaffolding is shoulders 
Elevated over years, countless hours 
At a cost often concealed from casual observation. 
Such insight proves troubling gossamer 
Unsettles the author, making the comfortable  
Perch that is the present, something less 
akin to certain. 
  
 
The demolition of the Van Horne mansion in 1973 was an example of a wider 
pattern of development in Montreal’s recently-established central business district.  
Henry Aubin’s multi-year investigation into the sources of capital being used for urban 
redevelopment revealed the trans-national workings at play in Montreal.  Business 
interests from a host of European nations provided the financing or financial backing for 
a host of residential and commercial constructions.  Throughout the post-war period 
Montreal established a reputation amongst foreign investors for its accessible property 
market, an environment supported by the municipal and provincial authorities.85 
Demolition permits were easy to come by and, until 1975, could be had for a $5 fee.86 
Montreal’s property tax structure also encouraged high-rise construction.  Property taxes 
were allocated based on the condition of the building and according to the “the highest 
potential economic use” for a particular site, that is if the site was deemed suitable for 
high-rise/density development.87  The former rewarded property owners who refused to 
maintain or renovate existing structures, while the latter provided the financial incentive 
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to redevelop a site by building a structure whose size would match the property taxes 
accorded to the site. 
 Publicly financed infrastructure projects also contributed to the redevelopment of 
Montreal.  Built to accommodate the soaring ambitions of the burgeoning Quebec middle 
class, these projects aided the development of the corporate city, including the Montreal 
Metro.  Critics of Mayor Drapeau charged that there was little coherent transportation 
planning aside from providing corporate workers and clients ease of access to the 
downtown area.88 The Metro, with its warren of subterranean tunnels providing ready 
connections to newly-built office complexes, aided Montreal in attracting national and 
international investors. 
 Montreal’s attractiveness for investors and developers also stemmed from the 
fact that other Canadian cities (of which Toronto was most notable) were adopting 
contrary urban planning policies.  By 1962, Toronto’s municipal government had 
abandoned large-scale urban renewal programs in favour of more sensitive, community 
oriented revitalization strategies.  First the Alexandra Park and, to an even greater 
degree, the Trefann Court project demonstrated a marked change in approach to 
renewal policies.89 The pre-existing modernist vision for the city was further undermined 
when, in June 1971, following years of vocal public opposition to Toronto’s Spadina 
Expressway, Ontario Premier Bill Davis cancelled the project.90  The next year David 
Crombie, an opponent of the expressway, was elected mayor of Toronto.  Under 
Crombie, Toronto City Council adopted a by-law that would require “specific exemption 
from Council for any buildings downtown more than 45 feet tall or 40,000 square feet in 
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size.”91 Despite the fact that city council provided many exemptions, development in 
downtown Toronto was diminished and greater emphasis was placed on harmonizing 
new projects with the city’s existing architecture and street grid.  This “tightening of 
development restrictions” taking place in Toronto and other Canadian cities made 
Montreal more attractive to property developers and the foreign capital that was 
supporting them.92 
 The result of this shifting political context was ongoing demolitions throughout 
Montreal, and especially in the city centre.  The numbers were dizzying.  Over a ten year 
period (1965-1975) the demolition rate accelerated from 1,600 to 2,500 residential units 
per year.93 In 1974 alone the city issued demolition permits for 245 buildings comprising 
1200 dwelling units.94 Furthermore, the rate of property abandonment also increased 
over this period.95 Low-cost housing was the primary casualty of Montreal’s 
modernization campaign.  The political support accorded to the rationalization of urban 
space ensured that developers encountered little to no opposition from government 
bodies.  Affordable family rental units were razed and not replaced in new 
developments.  While demolitions took place throughout the city, the low-rise residential 
areas ringing the burgeoning new office district centered on Boulevard René-Lévesque 
were the hardest hit.96 The effect these actions had on some residents was profound; 
provoking a strong, visceral reaction amongst those who later joined Save Montreal. 
Historian Joy Parr, writing about the effects that megaprojects had on local 
residents, noted how “radical changes had unsettled their daily lives and forced them to 
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encounter their environment anew and adapt the practices through which to live 
competently and sustainably day by day.”97 Having experienced massive changes to 
their local environment Montrealers were forced to rethink the ways in which they 
understood and synthesized their city.  Familiar patterns and landscapes had been 
altered or destroyed so Montreal’s residents had to relearn their city anew.  Parr 
considers this process to be ‘embodiment’, which acts both  
as active adaptation to changed circumstances and as ‘the whispering of ghosts’, 
relicts of past successful adaptations to familiar worlds later remade, persisting 
as familiars, reminders of losses, and also sources of resilience and resources 
for rebuilding.98 
 
The loss of vast tracts of the urban fabric provided inspiration to confront those who 
were responsible for Montreal’s remaking.  Although disorienting and depressing to the 
future Save Montrealers, past demolitions and future threats prompted individuals to 
challenge the prevailing high-modernist mentality. 
Not only were existing streets and buildings being erased, but the buildings 
erected in their place were often of inferior quality.  Frequently, they were not replaced 
with anything at all and instead left vacant, for parking or for a possible future project.  
While some notable projects from the 1960s were lauded for their architectural impact, 
the corporate and residential towers being constructed during the 1970s were, according 
to some Montrealers, not of the same standard.  Their designs lacked innovation and 
their concrete exteriors exhibited a mundane monotony.  In conversation, the Save 
Montrealers referred to the Shaughnessy Village neighbourhood as an area that best 
exemplifies this type of dull construction.99 In addition, the streetscapes themselves were 
irrevocably transformed.  Changes in scale brought about by relentless high-rise 
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construction produced an altogether different landscape from the low-rise, historic 
streetscapes that had predominated in what had been the Square Mile and adjoining 
neighbourhoods.  In other instances, homes were often lost to infrastructural projects 
such as the Ville-Marie Expressway and its off-ramps.  This was the case for Brian 
Merrett who witnessed his “neighbourhood suddenly transformed from a residential area 
with housing and of small apartment buildings all around into, eventually, in 1973, a 
highway exit ramp.”100 For Brian, photographs “became that document of ‘My goodness, 
what is happening to my neighbourhood?’”101 
For Adele, the changes resembled something out of this world – a scarred, lunar 
landscape, devoid of life: “It was going to look like something out of the moon, you 
know?”102 Her comparison of Montreal to the moon reveals the degree to which many 
parts of the city experienced structural obliteration, and how foreign these changes 
seemed.  Such frustration was echoed by Caroline Breslaw who related how precious 
Victorian homes were razed in the Shaughnessy Village area for proposed high-rises:   
Caroline – Let’s tear down the north side of Dorchester to put up high-rises.  Do 
you know they tore down, in the 60s, the citizens protested what was planned: 
two 25-storey towers near the corner of, west of Atwater on the north side of 
Dorchester.  The neighbours to the south in Shaughnessy Village protested and 
now we have parking lots.103 
 
Caroline uses ‘parking lots’ as means of emphasizing the follies of the past.  The fact 
that, over 40 years later, the site is still a parking lot highlights the senselessness of past 
decisions, especially given the public opposition at the time.  While office towers of poor 
architectural merit were obviously disheartening, the loss of cherished buildings for 
desolate parking spaces was downright galling.   
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While blame for these travesties was accorded to private interests and all three 
levels of government, it was the civic government, and Drapeau specifically, who bore 
the brunt of criticism.  As Adele notes, criticism stemmed from the manner and speed by 
which the city was being redeveloped: 
Adele – Absolutely, absolutely, there was absolutely a sense of urgency. Yes, 
absolutely. And, and, and at the same time, you know there, there was also such 
a lack of, you know the city of Montreal didn't, didn't have a plan, everything was 
very, was being rampant, you know, in a rampant way, in a random way.  
Drapeau was just running his administration whichever way he wanted, ‘This is 
what I want, this is what's going to happen’. {Chuckle} There was no opposition, 
there were no provincial laws, I mean, you know, everything had to be 
constructed, everything had to be created, laws had to be written.104 
 
As noted in the introduction, Drapeau’s critics charged that his administration 
operated in a fairly authoritarian manner.  City council rarely met, businessmen enjoyed 
unrestricted access to Drapeau, and there existed no avenues for civic input.  Until the 
1974 election, there existed virtually no elected opposition to Drapeau’s Civic Party.  
With such power, Drapeau pursued his developmental agenda which combined a 
“laissez-faire attitude” to private high-rise development with his pursuit of large-scale 
public projects.105 
Adele’s summary above reveals how development looked to the eyes of a 
Montreal resident – unplanned and hasty, without any concern for other opinions or 
perspectives.  Emphasizing the words rampant and random, Adele leaves one with the 
impression of unrelenting, senseless change.  Equally offensive for the interviewees 
were the architectural styles and forms foisted upon the city: 
Norman - I mean it was just ridiculous that people were coming in and felt free to 
tear down these buildings, and build monstrosities, including the city!  I mean it 
wasn’t like the City of Montreal wasn’t exempt.  The things that were being done 
under the renovation plan of the City of Montreal were horrible.  As a matter of 
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fact, they were probably the worst!  A private enterprise was doing a better job.  
The city was terrible!  And it did change, and it evolved under our pressure.106 
 
The civic government was not only passively aiding the redevelopment of Montreal, but it 
was also directly contributing to the destruction of the city’s streetscapes.  Criticizing the 
city in no uncertain terms, Norman is scathing in his analysis.  Norman was hardly alone 
in his characterization of the architectural styles then being utilized by both the city and 
private developers.  During this period noted architecture critics Reyner Banham and 
Peter Blake excoriated modernist architecture and the impact it had on cities 
everywhere.  According to Blake, modernist architecture was plagued with a host of 
problems, both aesthetic and dogmatic in nature, that were detrimental to the functioning 
of cities.  New materials weathered poorly, disfiguring the city whilst high-rises, 
internalized commercial areas, and windswept plazas eroded or destroyed the 
streetscape and the human-scale activity that accompanied it.107  The strict adherence to 
modernist principles such as decentralization, automobility, zoning and massive built 
forms was detrimental to cities and residents.  Blake concludes the real beneficiaries of 
modernist architecture were greed-motivated developers and realtors.108  Banham 
agrees, arguing that while modernist megastructures had been considered avant-garde 
and innovative during the 1960s, by the 1970’s they were being built by government 
bodies and private developers (Banham summarizes these actors as “the despised 
Establishment”) as a means of “maximizing the returns from urban development.”109 
These views were also in accordance with those articulated by Jane Jacobs over a 
decade before. 
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The critiques highlighted above were published during the mid-1970s, a time 
when high-modernist projects had already been defeated in certain jurisdictions.110 
Throughout the 1970s modernist ideologies would come under further assault.  The 
demolition of the massive Pruitt-Igoe housing complex in St. Louis, Missouri, only 22 
years old, was viewed as a resounding defeat for high-modernist principles.  Plagued by 
blight and crime, the complex proved a startling example of the failure to solve urban 
social and economic ills via top-down, statist initiatives.111 
Operating in concert with modernist critiques was a growing appreciation of 
existing built forms.  In Death and Life Jacobs had argued that aged buildings were 
necessary for the social and economic value they delivered to small shopkeepers and 
owners.  By the 1970s though, the appreciation for the aesthetics of heritage structures 
led to the occupation of these spaces first by artists and then by young professionals.  
Attracted by the heritage and industrial elements of these spaces, city newcomers often 
repurposed spaces, reflecting changing attitudes toward urban life.  Sharon Zukin 
considers this to be the “commercialization of cultural change”, a process whereby 
industrial spaces quickly morph into artistic production spaces before becoming sites of 
commerce and consumption.112 Despite many artists and professionals being against the 
profit-driven transformation of a neighbourhood, their presence often heralded the arrival 
of developers and retailers.113 This urban demographic and economic change, now most 
commonly referred to as gentrification, was taking place in urban centres throughout 
North America.  Newcomers to city centres inflated the housing costs, especially for 
rental units.  The conversion of rental units to condominiums, the demolition of existing 
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homes for new development, and the rehabilitation of homes for higher-income earners 
resulted in the displacement of low-income households.  In Toronto, for example, such 
changes to the housing market resulted in a displacement of 54,000 people between the 
mid-1970s and the mid-1980s.114 Similar trends were taking place in Montreal, especially 
in the Outremont and Plateau-Mont Royal neighbourhoods.  However, in comparison to 
other Canadian urban centres, the size of the city’s rental market meant there were often 
units available for displaced residents in close proximity to their original dwelling.  
Furthermore, while these residents experienced, on average, a 20% rent increase the 
units they occupied were usually in better condition.115 
However, despite the decline of high-modernist principles elsewhere, and a 
growing shift towards inner-city resettlement, redevelopment in Montreal’s city centre 
continued apace.  The electoral success of Drapeau’s Civic Party ensured that 
Montreal’s city government remained committed to a modernist planning agenda.  The 
democratic deficit in city affairs, the manner by which development occurred, and the 
perceived poor quality of those developments generated opposition towards Drapeau 
and the city government.  Feelings of sadness and loss produced by such circumstances 
prompted, even demanded, people to act.  The anger and frustration felt by many 
Montrealers was about to boil over, it only required a tipping point.  That tipping point 
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Illustration 2.1: The demolition of the Van Horne mansion, September 8, 1973. 
Copyright: La Presse.117 
 
The demolition of the Van Horne mansion was, unquestionably, the galvanizing 
event for many Montrealers, and an affair that attained national attention.  The home 
was purchased by developer David Azrieli with the intention of erecting an office tower 
on the site.118 News of the mansion’s proposed demolition inspired Michael Fish to help 
found a small group called Society for Great Places that included future Save 
Montrealers Audrey Bean and Peter Lanken.  They joined a growing chorus of 
opposition that was calling for the home’s preservation.  They took to the press, calling 
                                                 
116
 A general chronology of the events leading to the Van Horne mansion’s destruction can be 
found in Donna Gabeline, Dane Lanken and Gordon Pape, Montreal at the Crossroads (Montreal: 
Harvest House Ltd., 1975) or Martin Drouin, “Les campagnes de sauvegarde de la maison Van 
Horne et du couvent des Soeurs grises ou les questionnements d’une identité urbaine (Montréal, 
1973-1976),” Journal of the Society for the Study of Architecture 26.4 (2001): 25-36. 
117
 “Demolition of the Van Horne Mansion.” La Presse, September 10, 1973. Available from: 
Encyclopedia of French Cultural Heritage in North America. Accessed December 10, 2015. 
http://www.ameriquefrancaise.org/en/article-459/Van_Horne_Mansion_(1870-
1973):_a_Demolition_That_Changed_the_History_of_Heritage_Preservation.html             
Used with permission. Copyright La Presse. 
118
 At the time Azrieli was a little-known developer who had accrued capital through the sale of 
other projects to primarily German real estate interests.  See Aubin, City for Sale, 158-160. 
  
37 
for the house, once home to Van Horne’s revered art collection, to be taken over by the 
Museum of Fine Arts.  Michael believed the building perfectly suited for the museum: 
Michael – I was kind of a volunteer with the museum, the Montreal Museum, and 
I had done a little travelling in Europe and it was the ideal house for the museum 
as most of the paintings in the Montreal Museum were from the estate of William 
Van Horne.  You know, it could have been another Frick.119 
  
 Michael’s sentiments were echoed by others writing to the city’s newspapers 
recommending other uses for the building be considered, including a library or small 
museum.  By advocating an alternative use for the building, Michael, and others, 
demonstrated the value of buildings, not solely as historical artifacts, but as structures 
with inherent use.  Conceptually, this reflects David Lowenthal’s argument that physical 
vestiges of the past should be considered malleable so as to remain pertinent for the 
future.120 The presentation of alternative plans for sites, with greater detail and insight, 
would become an important tool in future Save Montreal campaigns. 
Governmental bodies displayed an indifference to the fate of the Van Horne 
mansion.  Arguments that highlighted William Van Horne’s prominent role in the 
construction of the CPR did not move government officials or even had the reverse 
effect.  As Drouin notes, Van Horne’s role as an American born, English-speaking 
capitalist curried him little favour in post-Quiet Revolution Montreal.121 Such arguments 
were also recalled by the interviewees who did not share this assessment of Van Horne 
or this reason for demolishing the home.  Brian Merrett was shocked, “Here was, you 
know, the man of the CPR, here was an artist, here was a collector, here was somebody 
who was influential and nobody lifted a finger to preserve that house.”122 In conversation 
with Peter, the logic of the ‘Van Horne persona’ argument was discussed: 
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Peter – Part of the argument was that it should be classified and then, oh boy, 
and then some people said ‘No, you should tear it down because Van Horne was 
not a nice man, and he exploited the workers.’  And that doesn’t quite ring true to 
me somehow.  
{Mutual chuckle} 
Eliot – You could tear down Versailles, right, by that logic. 
Peter – Well, like they tore down the Tuileries in Paris, you know…123 
 
The exchange, including Peter’s evocation of the French royal palace destroyed by the 
Paris Commune in 1870, demonstrates our mutual distrust of demolition with political 
intent.  The Van Horne mansion’s historical and architectural legacy revealed Montreal’s 
linguistic-political divide.  The bureaucratization and centralization programs of the Quiet 
Revolution had alienated many Anglophones who fought back against the nationalism 
that pervaded newly-created government departments.  In doing so, Arnopoulos and 
Clift note, the English community “became a leading target…of growing social unrest in 
Quebec.”124 
The provincial Department of Cultural Affairs, after initially agreeing to classify 
the building as a historical monument under the recently passed Cultural Property Act, 
decided to refuse classification.  Then Cultural Affairs Minister François Cloutier argued 
that the ministry was only “concerned with preserving those buildings which are 
important to the history and culture of Quebec” and that it was the federal government’s 
prerogative to “save buildings important to Canadian history and culture.”125 Adding to 
the intrigue was the admission of the 12-person Cultural Property Commission, 
responsible for advising the minister on such matters, that they had not been consulted 
on Cloutier’s change of heart.126  Appeals made to Premier Robert Bourassa were 
spurned.  The federal government was apathetic, and had little power in the matter as 
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federal historic designations carry no protection against demolition.127 Finally, despite 
some support amongst the city councillors to save the building, the city “was hampered 
by the restrictions of its charter and had no power to intervene.”128 Montreal had no 
“authority to refuse to grant a demolition permit if all legal requirements are met and the 
developer is acting within zoning regulations.”129 Weak laws governing urban 
development and a lack of interest produced a scenario where the three levels of 
government failed to protect a building that many Montrealers considered to be of 
national significance.  Unfortunately, these governments would continue to hinder the 
efforts of these same individuals for years to come. 
 Perhaps most galling to the Van Horne mansion’s supporters was the mediocrity 
of the building that took its place.  Irregardless of Van Horne’s legacy, and the 
architectural and heritage merits of the building, was the fact that David Azrieli built an 
office tower that the Save Montrealers considered mundane and unimaginative.  
Recalling his mood following the mansion’s demolition, Peter offered his opinions on 
Azrieli and Van Horne saga: 
Peter - Anyway it had been gone and in the afternoon we did some press 
conference and interview stuff.  You know, for all the energy that had been put 
into it we got beat, for sure.  And we were beaten by…how do I say this…by an 
uninteresting man who had no culture and no respect, and did what he did for 
commercial reasons.130 
 
Peter then followed with an anecdote from the French Grand Prix of 1979.  In that race 
Montreal’s Gilles Villeneuve beat Réné Arnoux in what is considered one of the best 
races of all time.  The caliber of the competition both racers offered each other ensured 
the quality of the race and their performance.  Afterward, the two men would embrace 
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each other as “they both realized they had raced, each of them had raced the other to a 
height that they could never had done by themselves.”131 Peter concluded,  
Peter – That’s one way of getting beaten. 
Eliot – Right. 
Peter – When you get beaten by, you know, somebody you don’t respect… 
Eliot - Right. 
Peter - That hurts a little bit.132 
 
Peter’s hurt stems from the undistinguished results of the Van Horne fight.  The tower 
that replaced the mansion was viewed with dismay; its austere façade considered 
unremarkable.133 Furthermore, Azrieli was not seen as a worthy opponent for his actions 
indicated values fundamentally different than those held by the future Save Montrealers.  
The destruction of a cherished building, its early morning demolition, and subsequent 
replacement with a mediocre office tower painted him as shallow in the eyes of those 
interviewed.  Adding insult to injury was Azrieli’s decision to inscribe his name in stone in 
front of his newly erected tower.134 
The home’s demolition illustrated the profound changes taking place in Montreal 
at the time.  The provincial and city governments were intent on remodeling the city 
centre as a means of encouraging economic growth while also supporting nationalist 
sentiments.  New modernist constructions were believed to epitomize a renewed 
confidence in Montreal’s economy and an affirmation of the invigorated self-assurance 
felt amongst French-Canadians as a result of the Quiet Revolution. These efforts 
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mirrored steps taken in social policy.  The Cultural Property Act, passed in 1972, firmly 
emphasized the province’s French cultural heritage, creating categories for vernacular 
religious structures and French regime buildings.135 The francisation of the province 
continued with the passage of Bill 22 in 1974.  That bill streamlined immigrant children 
into the French school system and ended official bilingualism in the province.136 
The Van Horne mansion was evidently disadvantaged by its location in an area 
selected for modernist redevelopment, and its association with a wealthy, Anglophone 
capitalist.  However, considering the fact that three properties of similar pedigree and in 
the immediate vicinity to the Van Horne site were given provincial heritage status the 
following year, perhaps it was modernist planning principles and economic 
considerations that prevailed in this instance.137 The flip-flop of the Minister of Cultural 
Affairs on the Van Horne file is confounding.  The discussions between the minister and 
the Cultural Property Commission were deemed confidential at the time138 rendering it 
difficult to discern the exact motivations for the decision.  While highly interventionist 
throughout the 1960s, by the 1970s the provincial government had become more 
inclined to give private developers a freer hand in the remodeling of downtown Montreal.  
Ultimately, whatever the reasons may be for its loss, protection for the house fell beyond 
governmental priorities at the time. 
The demolition of the Van Horne mansion affected a number of Montrealers on 
an immediate and personal basis.  As alluded to, these individuals were primarily 
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Anglophone, but not exclusively so.139 These residents were awakened to the fact that 
virtually nothing was sacred in the city, not even cherished local landmarks.  The 
provincial and municipal governments, nationalist and pro-development in outlook, could 
not be relied upon to protect these structures.  The impact the home’s demolition had on 
the interviewees and their community was a common topic in conversation: 
Adele – And I remember that day very clearly in my mind. I was on that street 
corner with my son and there was the big ball and the house was coming down 
and I even picked up um some kind of relic, I don't know, it was a piece of stone 
or whatever and I had it for a long time, I don't know what I did with it.  And, um, 
after that I said there's something wrong about that. Why are they tearing down 
housing? Why are they tearing down such beautiful houses?140 
 
Adele’s inability to comprehend the reasons why such a building was demolished was 
shared by others.  Lonnie spoke about how “it was such a shock and just a feeling of 
loss, of great loss and the feeling it can never be restored, you can never bring it 
back.”141 Feelings of sadness and loss were a common pattern.  They revealed the ways 
in which structural change to one’s environment impacted residents lives. 
 Conversations and readings regarding the Van Horne saga reveal the 
palimpsestic qualities inherent to the site.  “The trope of the palimpsest” Andreas 
Huyssen remarks can “be fruitfully used to discuss configurations of urban spaces and 
their unfolding in time without making architecture and the city simply into text.”142 
Furthermore, Huyssen argues that  
an urban imaginary in its temporal reach may well put different things in one 
place: memories of what there has been before, imagined alternatives to what 
there is.  The strong marks of present space merge in the imaginary with traces 
of the past, erasures, losses, and heterotopias.143 
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The Van Horne mansion site, in the realm of the imaginary, is imbued with multiple 
meanings and traces of the past.  Currently housing a five-star Sofitel Hotel used by 
dignitaries and hockey players, the site is still connected to the home’s demolition.   
Arguments for the preservation of Van Horne’s mansion created further layers of 
history and meaning.  Drouin notes how the fate of the house pitted modernist city-
building aspirations against the construction of local identity.  Ideas of what constituted a 
“Montreal identity” or “Montrealness” were being transformed and residents were 
attributing a identity to the Van Horne mansion and other structures in the area.  
Nowadays, Drouin considers the destruction of Van Horne’s home “l’événement 
fondateur qui institua l’«an 1» de la lutte pour la reconnaissance du paysage bâti à 
Montréal”,144 a viewpoint shared by many Save Montrealers.  Although the site is starkly 
different than its previous incarnation, it nonetheless carries with it important 
connotations and traces that render it a site of ongoing interpretation and imagination.  
The site would be continually associated with the mansion and its loss as revealed by 
the ongoing recognition its demolition date receives.145 The Sofitel Hotel itself even pays 
tribute to the home itself by displaying a few architectural fragments original to the home 
in its lobby. 
From a more tangible perspective, the destruction of the Van Horne mansion 
established a pattern that was often replicated in future preservation battles: private 
developer aided by government acquiescence or government body as developer, 
architectural homogeneity via modernist forms, and a poor understanding of the 
economic impact of such projects.  The early high-modernist structures (Place Ville-
Marie, Expo 67) that had fired the imaginations of Montrealers gave way to a glaring 
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monotony throughout Montreal’s cityscape.  As Aubin noted in his exposé of property 
ownership and investment in Montreal, development firms such as Trizec were, in order 
to maximize profits, erecting generic, standardized forms in cities throughout North 
America.146 Developers looking to reduce prohibitive costs associated with skyscraper 
construction were required to clad the exterior of a building with the most basic material 
(light metal, glass, plastic).147 Furthermore, skyscraper designs were increasingly built 
with the realtor in mind.  As a result, Blake argues that thanks to skyscrapers modernist 
architecture has become “the chief apologist for the real estate speculator.”148  
As modernist forms proliferated throughout urban centres, critiques arose to 
counter the narratives being proffered by modernism’s proponents.  Arguing in favour of 
architectural pluralism (and against architectural conformity), Italian architect Bruno Zevi, 
in his Expo 67 address, claimed that modern architecture “states that our world is too 
complicated, too various, too contradictory to be expressed in one coherent style.  A 
democracy can be managed only with many tendencies and contradictory elements.”149 
Such sentiment was echoed later by Charney who claimed that “institutionalized 
architecture in its present form has lost all meaning.”150 Instead, he advocated “an 
authentic architecture born of real things and rooted in people’s lives.”151 To modernist 
critics, architecture had to be representative of the polyglot society in which it was being 
practiced.  Although the members of Save Montreal may not have characterized their 
actions in such terms, they were nonetheless concerned with a variety of buildings from 
differing eras.  The campaigns they undertook were rooted in the 19th century, Victorian 
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city; an area Drouin posits became integral to an emerging “Montreal identity”.152 It was 
in this milieu in which Save Montreal contested the orthodoxy of development employed 





 In the immediate wake of the Van Horne mansion’s demolition, eleven local 
activist groups came together to announce the formation of Save Montreal, initially 
conceptualized as a federation of urban preservation societies. These groups 
represented the residents’ efforts to halt the demolition of particular sites both downtown 
or to the west of the city centre.  Examples included the Friends of Windsor Station, the 
Society for Great Places, the Lower Westmount Association, the Milton-Park Committee 
and the Community Design Workshop.153 Common to all groups was the fact they were 
defined by a single-issue or cause; they represented threats to buildings: Windsor 
Station, Van Horne mansion, or areas of the city: Lower Westmount, Milton-Park and 
Little Burgundy.  Others, such as Society to Overcome Pollution (STOP) and Green 
Spaces were concerned with the city at large, but were primarily concerned with 
pollution and the elimination of green areas.  While there were some instances of 
membership overlap, these groups operated independently of one another.  However, 
the Van Horne mansion’s demolition demonstrated the need for solidarity.  Save 
Montreal was intended to change the dynamics of citizen advocacy by unifying local 
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groups under one banner.  In doing so, the members believed they could better contest 
the form and manner in which Montreal was being redeveloped.154  
The organization’s inaugural meeting was held on October 13, 1973 at the 
University Settlement, a community centre located east of the McGill campus on Rue St-
Urbain, on October 13, 1973.  Between 30 to 40 people attended.155 Designated 
speakers held discussion panels where pressing issues facing Montreal were 
addressed.  The result of the meeting was the founding of Save Montreal and the 
adoption of the following resolution: 
This organization dedicates itself to the preservation of housing and community 
assets, for the shelter and enjoyment of all citizens of the region of Montreal.   
Community assets are understood to include buildings of social and cultural 
value, and open spaces within and around the urban region. 
Furthermore, this organization will work actively to support the achievement of 
planning legislation that will be responsive to the needs and wishes of the 
citizens of Montreal.156 
 
The resolution highlights the urban conservationist principles of Save Montreal and can 
be read almost as a blueprint for future actions by the group. 
  That first meeting proved to be a turning point in Montreal’s urban preservation 
movement and for the members themselves.  As Jane Broderick recalls: “And I went to 
the meeting and you realize that there were a lot of other people who felt the same way I 
did, it was kind of a nice feeling.”157  That first meeting provided a venue where people 
with similar thoughts and feelings could encounter one another.  When considering the 
loss and sadness caused by mass demolitions, it was comforting to encounter others 
with similar values.  This was also true for individuals who joined Save Montreal in 
subsequent years.  Norman relates that: “And all of a sudden, you know, you were going 
                                                 
154
 Luana Parker, “Lesson learned from Van Horne mansion fight: ‘It’s gloves off’ to preserve 
historic buildings’,” The Gazettte, September 29, 1973. 
155
 As remembered by Jane Broderick, interview with Eliot Perrin, Montreal, November 7, 2013. 
156
 Reprinted in Save Montreal, SOS Montreal 1.1 (February 1976): 17. 
157
 Jane Broderick. 
  
47 
to meetings, planning protests, it was instant!”158 Despite joining years after its founding, 
Norman was immediately inducted and participated in campaigns.  The energy and 
passion during the group’s first meeting remained undimmed years later.  This strong 
social element bolstered the group’s identity and allowed Save Montreal to maximize its 
reach within the community.  As Peter notes, “…this was the genius of Save Montreal, 
that everybody knew someone.”159 Some individuals were already familiar with each 
other due to past previous experiences with other activist groups; such was the case 
with Peter Lanken, Michael Fish and Audrey Bean who were all members of Friends of 
Windsor Station.  Some individuals were the members of multiple groups, providing a 
general awareness of the greater activist community.  Other connections were the result 
of shared employment, for example Peter, Mark London, Linda Thompson and Julia 
Gersovitz were all employed at the architectural firm ARCOP.  Friendship-based, word-
of-mouth networking also played a part in informing the general public of Save 
Montreal’s existence and would help diffuse information regarding meetings and 
campaigns.  Finally, some individuals arrived at Save Montreal meetings through 
happenstance, having seen a printed or posted notice for the group.  This informal 
strategy, while sufficiently inclusive, made for a diverse group. 
Save Montreal’s membership defies simple categorization.  For example, Peter 
describes how 
Save Montreal, at its greatest period, was an amalgam of really different people.  
There was Westmount people, and I’m not saying any people were not 
dedicated, but there were different kinds of people.  Some of them worked in 
offices, you know, had good jobs, and some of them lived in the Centre-Sud.160 
 
Those who regularly attended meetings stemmed from different socio-economic 
backgrounds.  Some members had especially modest upbringings while others had 
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grown up in far more privileged circumstances.  As a result, the Save Montrealers hailed 
from a variety of neighbourhoods including Westmount, Milton-Parc, the Centre-Sud and 
the Plateau.  Some members were born and raised in Montreal while others were recent 
transplants to the city.  Personal circumstances did not seem to play a role in the way 
individuals interacted with the organization or other members.  If anything, the 
interviewees exhibited a subtle pride for Save Montreal’s openness to all, especially in 
these early stages.161  
Although the group operated primarily in the former Square Mile, they did not 
reflect the traditional Anglo-Saxon/Anglo-Celtic populace of the area.  A number of the 
Save Montrealers were Jewish, and the member’s families reflected an array of 
European backgrounds.  Even though they were advocating for the retention of stately 
19th Victorian homes, religious buildings and commercial sites, their reasons for doing so 
were not due to familial or cultural association: 
Dimitri – It was, in other words as Save Montreal grew and connected with other 
social movements, a variety of people came from a variety of backgrounds and 
they had one love in common, this city and the historic city, which their 
forefathers didn't live in.  I mean, Jane Broderick's family did not live in the Van 
Horne mansion, nor did Adele Isaac's (Mardoche), nor did mine.  But that doesn't 
mean we couldn't feel pain... 
Eliot – Right, right. 
Dimitri –  When the bastards took it down (the Van Horne mansion) a tocsin rang 
across Montreal.162   
 
While diverse in many respects, the organization was predominantly 
Anglophone.  Initial meetings were conducted in English and internal documents 
reflected the linguistic make-up of the group.163 Asked why this was the case, the 
interviewees, for the most part, did not have concrete answers or even found the 
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discrepancy noteworthy.  Considering the oft-cited regional linguistic jostling, the 
absence of tension within the group was surprising.  While disproportionately an 
Anglophone group, the members all held some degree of fluency in French as exhibited 
by the articles they submitted to French newspapers.  Furthermore, the French-language 
press – especially Le Devoir, but also La Presse – were considered sympathetic to Save 
Montreal’s cause.164 
Save Montreal’s members also hailed from a variety of professions, although 
architects featured prominently amongst those interviewed.165 As noted above, four Save 
Montrealers worked for ARCOP during a time when the firm was engaged in a number 
of prominent projects that conformed to modernist ideas and form, including Place 
Bonaventure and an early proposal for the La Cité project threatening the Milton-Parc 
neighbourhood.166 Unsurprisingly, those from other backgrounds also exhibited a strong 
personal and professional interest in urban life and the social issues at play.167 
While cognizant of the group’s diversity, the Save Montrealers frequently 
conveyed feeling a shared sense of dedication to both their organization and their city.  
Such dedication was evidenced by their tireless commitment and willingness to execute 
tasks.  In conversation Jane pointed out that “it was never a lot of talk and no action.”168 
This view was supported by Peter who recalled that “Simply because there was a small 
group of people with a common objective and, you know somehow or other, the work got 
distributed and it got done.”169 The group’s prolificacy speaks to that.  Meetings were 
held every week, from which sprung a flurry of activity: letters to the press, press 
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conferences, research, writing, and performance of walking tours, protests, information 
sessions, colloquiums, meetings with governmental officials, article writing, newsletter 
design and formatting, development of counter-proposals, and gathering petitions.  
Aside from these activities Save Montrealers held jobs and had responsibilities that 
occupied their daytime hours.  Some were students working on degrees.  Many also had 
families, sometimes young children.  The meetings and activities described above were 
conducted in the Save Montrealers’ ‘off-hours’, times of the day when most people 
dedicated themselves to their personal lives.  As a result the sacrifices, small and large, 
were many.  Personal relationships were, at times, foresworn or lost.  Writing from the 
comfortable perch of the present, it is easy to overlook these details.  While this level of 
dedication did produce some unfortunate consequences, it is what helped make Save 
Montreal such an effective organization.   
 In conversation, the former Save Montrealers often emphasized the sense of 
commitment and shared instances of camaraderie that resulted from their participation 
with the group: 
Adele – Yes, and that camaraderie, you see? You see, that's very important. 
When you’re a member of a group that has the same ideals, the same goal and 
that is willing to put up the time without, you know, without even thinking.. you 
just do it. You just get involved. You take your kid along you.  You call, you know, 
my parents and, you know, I'm on TV tonight or this is happening and, there's a 
march and I mean, you know, they, they thought I was crazy but, you, you just do 
it because your surrounded by people who are also working at it and your not 
alone, you know? So that's wonderful.170 
 
Adele’s warm recollections were very much representative of the conversations as a 
whole.  Despite different cultural and socio-economic backgrounds and living in different 
areas of the city, the members of Save Montreal created a community rooted in shared 
ideals and aspirations for the future. The type of community they created is one 
suggested by social network theory.  Steven High and John C. Walsh argue that social 
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network theory “does not assume that community exists (or does not exist) based on 
place.”171 What connected these individuals was not a shared sense of place, but rather 
an affiliation based on shared experiences and the sensations they produced.  The Save 
Montreal community has now evolved to occupy the realm of shared memory.  The 
warm and positive associations with their youth and past activism common to the Save 





Although founded as a federation, Save Montreal came to operate as its own 
distinct association.  Some of the organizations – Friends of Windsor Station and Society 
for Great Places, for example – were, by admission of the interviewees, quite small in 
membership.  They, and others, were effectively subsumed into Save Montreal since the 
larger group could, and did, advocate for the same causes.  Others, such as Green 
Spaces and STOP held a broader mandate and continued independently while working 
in conjunction with Save Montreal.  Tax deductible memberships were offered as a 
means of fund-raising, with members receiving the group’s publication by mail.172 The 
group held weekly meetings at a member’s home, the University Settlement, or in the St. 
Cunégonde Church parish house where they had an office for a few years.  The 
production of press releases, the publication of a periodical, the operating of walking 
tours, the holding of information talks and film screenings, and even the issuance of 
buttons and t-shirts speaks to the formation of a distinct Save Montreal identity. 
Complimenting Save Montreal’s emerging identity was a dedication to a 
democratic way of operating.  From the outset, Save Montreal deliberately eschewed the 
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adoption of assigned positions or a strict hierarchy of roles.  According to Michael, “Save 
Montreal had never even had a structure” and “nobody wanted a structure.”173  This view 
was supported by Peter who argued that “Save Montreal was structured as pretty much 
open.”174 There existed an executive core which fluctuated from year to year.  There was 
no set number of executives; it consisted of those individuals who attended meetings the 
most regularly.  For legal purposes, there was a president and officers, but that was 
strictly to handle the finances accrued by the organization.  However, these were surface 
formalities and did not reflect the manner in which Save Montreal conducted itself. 
A good illustration of this was given in conversation by Peter who, for legal 
purposes only, acted as president for a number of years: 
Peter - I was just a representative like everybody else.  Which I think it had to be 
like that, so anybody who had something to say and would come to the meeting 
and say ‘Could I use the name Save Montreal for this issue?’ and generally the 
answer would be yes and we’d say ‘Well, here’s how to do it, here’s a list of 
people to call in the media, here’s the politicians you have to talk to.  Here it is, 
go on and do it! 
Eliot - Yeah, yeah. 
Peter - And call yourself Save Montreal.  Absolutely, go and do it!175 
 
As described by Peter above, Save Montreal operated with a degree of fluidity 
when deciding which campaigns to undertake.  Particular issues and causes were raised 
at meetings and, following discussion, a decision was made as to whether to pursue the 
matter.  Members were often encouraged to spearhead campaigns themselves.  If an 
individual raised an issue they considered pressing at a Save Montreal meeting that 
person was charged with organizing the group’s response.  Such was the case with 
Susan Stanley who, concerned by the proposed demolition of St. Stephen’s Church at 
the corner of Atwater and Dorchester, contacted Michael Fish who, in turn, explained 
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how one could organize a preservation campaign.176 Absent was the need to be 
contingent on one authority.  Furthermore, as Peter notes above, Save Montreal was 
also willing to share its name with individuals who were advocating for a similar cause.   
Peter - Because there was a number of people who could, and did, speak in the 
name of Save Montreal, that was effective. 
Eliot - Yeah, it wasn’t just all hinging on one person. 
Peter - It would have died.  It wouldn’t have worked.177 
 
In conversation Peter noted, this approach had both practical and ideological 
applications.  By delegating responsibility, the group was able to launch numerous 
campaigns simultaneously.  Considering the scale to which Montreal’s city centre was 
being redeveloped, the ability to operate on multiple fronts was an asset and gave the 
group greater public exposure.  The selection and mounting of campaigns through group 
discussion or personal initiative also highlighted how fundamental a democratic, non-
hierarchical form of governance was to the group.  Meetings and activities were open to 
all who wished to join.  Save Montreal helped coordinate the Citizens’ Commission on 
the Future of Montreal, a series of public forums “designed to serve as a forum for 
citizen participation in planning the future of the city.”178  As will be demonstrated in 
Chapter Two, Save Montreal throughout their campaigns would consistently demand 
public participation for particular projects, and in conceptualizing development at large.  
In this way, the group resembled the federative model it had originally sought to 
implement.  However, the group was still contingent on the Save Montreal identity and 
structure (meetings, publications, etc.). 
In order to operate effectively Save Montreal asked that its membership be 
organized and educated about the issues facing Montreal and how to organize a 
campaign.  Some members, such as Michael Fish and Peter Lanken, had some prior 
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experience with preservation campaigns, while Lucia Kowaluk and Dimitri Roussopoulos 
had been involved with the anti-nuclear movement and community organizing.  Most 
members, though, were new to advocacy and learned via their peers and through 
personal experience.  Describing her involvement, Adele Mardoche notes how the 
organization was a synthesis of community awareness exercises and personal learning:  
Adele – There was, you know, I was a foot soldier, really.  I marched and I put up 
posters, and I talked on interviews, I did door knocking.  I even took a course at 
Concordia actually that was one year, six-credit course in urban planning. It was 
a wonderful course.  And we also used to do book readings. Dimitri especially, 
Dimitri Roussopoulos would have, you know he would have us read books and 
we would have discussions because, you know, we needed to get educated, I 
mean I needed to be educated.179 
 
In her interview, Jane Broderick also described herself as a “foot soldier”.180  In both 
cases, I felt the descriptors to be intentionally modest, perhaps even purposely 
diminishing one’s role.  The interviews with Adele and Jane were also the first two I 
conducted.  Throughout the interview process I was often met with similar modesty on 
the part of the interviewee’s, either by downplaying one’s own role or highlighting the 
work of others.  By diverting praise to other members, the Save Montrealers 
demonstrated a desire to recognize the work of others while also reinforcing the non-
hierarchial manner by which the group operated.  As will be evidenced further in chapter 
three, the members of Save Montreal undertook different roles and participated in 
particular campaigns. 
 True to Save Montreal’s nature, the manner by which campaigns were assigned 
and conducted, and information disseminated was highly-democratic.  In mounting these 
campaigns, Mark London noted a certain naivety to the group’s proceedings and to what 
they could possibly accomplish: 
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Mark - And we would say ‘Oh, ok, we’ve got six items on the agenda this week.  
So and so, this building over here is threatened, someone’s threatening to tear 
this down, ok you and you, you’re in charge of that one.  Come back in a week 
with a plan to save that one.  And there’s this other one, ok let’s have a report 
from the people who are working on saving this other one.’  And, in an hour and 
a quarter, we would go through, we would just run it as, and we had no idea we 
couldn’t actually do these things, right?  That we couldn’t save these buildings… 
Eliot - Ok. 
Mark - Or these complexes, or preserve these green spaces.  It didn’t occur to us 
that we couldn’t do it.  We’d just out and try and do it.  And very often were 
successful.181 
 
This feeling may have been more pronounced in those without previous activist 
experience, although it was undoubtedly a learning experience for all.  However, what 
could have been a drawback was actually an advantage.  The energy and passion that 
stemmed from their commutuality made them less fearful of failure.  Had they been 
aware of the forces aligned against them, they may not have brought the same verve or 
stamina.  Considering the group’s weekly diligence and degree of public prominence, it 
seems this naivety served them well. 
 In educating themselves about the threats posed to Montreal’s urban fabric and 
the mechanics behind public awareness, the members of Save Montreal were also 
cultivating a response to the projects they were opposing.  Rather than just shouting 
‘Stop!’ at new development the group sought to articulate a different approach to 
Montreal’s built form and future city building.  That approach was best argued by offering 
alternatives; viable options that demonstrated how new development and urban 
conservation could operate in unison.  Despite their claims, the projects favoured by 
governmental bodies were detrimental to the local economy.  Save Montreal’s campaign 
writings often identified the incongruities between development and the economy.  As 
Julia Gersovitz recounted, Save Montreal became a mechanism by which the public 
could be made aware of, and interpret, redevelopment schemes: 
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Julia – Yes and also we were able to make, I don't mean that they were 
developed at enormous depth, but you were able to critique things that were 
being said. You know often when a development scheme comes out the 
developer packages it in such a way that looks very shiny. And the public, who 
are laymen, are not necessarily able to have the critical eye, or the critical 
judgment to critique it. What we were able to supply was that critical eye and 
sometimes there were counter-proposals drafted up, you know.182 
 
Julia’s observation, whereby Save Montreal acted as interlocutor and critic of proposed 
developments for the general public, could be read as running contrary to Save 
Montreal’s democratic and non-hierarchial ideals.  However, Sharon Zukin notes that 
“the state's method of operation is fairly subtle. It both transforms the social climate that 
surrounds the built environment and institutionalizes the climactic changes that are 
thereby imposed on the positions of investors and consumers.”183  While Zukin’s position 
stems from her analysis of loft conversions, it is nonetheless prescient.  Langdon 
Winner, in discussing the politics of artifacts, posits a similar argument.  Describing the 
urban developments of Robert Moses, Winner notes that “many of his monumental 
structures of concrete and steel embody a systematic social inequality, a way of 
engineering relationships among people that, after a time, becomes just another part of 
the landscape.”184 In Montreal, the state was attempting to transform residents’ spatial 
understandings and institutionalize climatic change, albeit in the form of high-modernist 
megastructures and their corresponding transportation infrastructure. 
 Save Montreal’s urban conservation ideals reflect the group’s rejection of this 
modernist orthodoxy.  Responding to these changes, the group launched numerous 
urban conservationist campaigns against a myriad of development projects.  The 
subjects of these campaigns were buildings and structures which played an important 
role at the local level.  Their absence, it was argued, would be detrimental, even ruinous, 
to the local economy and to the lives of those who lived and worked in the area.  In 
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making this argument, Save Montreal attempted to counter an economic narrative that 
had been successfully deployed throughout North America. 
 This is not to argue that Save Montreal necessarily stood in opposition to the 
government’s objectives, it was that they rejected the form and methods governmental 
bodies employed to achieve their modernist agendas, and lamented the results.  The 
circumstances that produced Save Montreal were a result of a democratic deficit on the 
municipal level and the absence of applied planning principles.  At the provincial and 
federal level, political and economic concerns, with a similar absence of planning policy, 
produced comparable results.  The outcomes were disastrous for Montreal 
neighbourhoods.  The form and function envisioned by the political and economic 
leaders produced staggering changes to Montreal’s built form, changes that demanded 
an active opposition. 
 The next chapter highlights the diversity of structures Save Montreal campaigned 
to save.  It also demonstrates the variety of methods employed by Save Montreal; 
evidence of the non-hierarchial structure assumed by the group.  The discussion that 
follows represents only a portion of Save Montreal’s activities.  Nonetheless, these are 
the campaigns that featured most prominently throughout virtually every interview.  
These campaigns confronted the undemocratic, high-modernist manner by which 
Montreal’s urban centre was being redeveloped while arguing in favour of citizen 
participation, heritage preservation, neighbourhood retention, recognition of the local 












Chapter Two: Campaigns 
 
The only way to witness is by walking 
Cities are not static spaces, they 
Decline the inhibition of automobility 
Instead crave familiarity, presence 
And in their absence, mourning  
But, if intimacy is the cipher 
For the book of lamentations 
Can a migrant ever solve these streets 
With only faded images 




Rue St-Norbert, 1975 
 
Jane - “And that was a beautiful little row of houses, very modest you know, not 
of great architectural significance, but a nice little row.  And it was only one side 
of the street because the other side of the street was the Bon-Pasteur, I think.” 
Eliot – “Ok, yep, on the other side.” 
Jane - “That whole row, it was one block, was threatened and that was sort of a 
big thing because there were people who occupied the buildings.  So we got 
involved in that, a lot of people, a lot of my friends from Save Montreal got 
involved in that.  And we stayed down there for a month, so that was kind 
of…that was interesting.”  {Chuckle}185 
 
Throughout the summer of 1975, Save Montreal members joined demonstrations 
against the planned demolition of row houses along Rue St-Norbert.186 The city, having 
passed a resolution to expropriate the homes, planned to evict the 50 residents (who 
occupied 40 apartments) and demolish the buildings in favour of a municipal public 
works yard.  When announcing the plan, Le Devoir noted the irony in tearing down 
homes amidst an ongoing housing crisis.  Despite the civic administration claiming 
housing was a priority, they were determined to demolish the homes for a parking lot.187  
In response, residents formed the St. Norbert Tenants’ Association to combat the 
decision, arguing for renovation as an alternative to demolition.188   
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Responding to the Tenants’ Association appeal, community groups lent their 
support, including the Montreal Citizens Movement, Comité Logement Saint-Louis, and 
Save Montreal.  Asked by the Association to assess the homes, Michael Fish and Phyllis 
Lambert concluded the structures were structurally sound and that renovation was a 
cheaper option to constructing new units to re-house the families.189 Attempts to 
designate the Monastère Bon-Pasteur north of St-Norbert190 and efforts to communicate 
alternatives to demolition were rebuffed by city officials.  As a result, mass eviction was 
scheduled for July 30th, 1975.  Lacking options, the Tenants’ Association opted to resist 
demolition by occupying the homes.191 
Their actions received media attention, bolstered by sympathetic organizations 
that helped keep the demolition question front and centre.  In response, six squatters 
were arrested and charged with ‘refusing to circulate’ when city workers arrived to shut 
off the utilities.192  Despite the arrests, others joined the squat, including members of 
Save Montreal, hoping to call attention to the problems facing low-cost housing in the 
city.193 Amongst them were Jane and Peter: 
Eliot – You stayed in the buildings? 
Jane – Yeah, for I think most nights.  I was probably there most nights.  I can’t 
remember how often I would, you know, go home for a couple of days, or a day 
just to change my clothes or something.  I wasn’t working at the time, or I was 
working a little bit, I had a few jobs, you know, so very little.  So, I had the time.  
When I didn’t stay there overnight, I was there a lot during the day as well.  So, 
you know, it was a whole month.  I think it was the month of August.194 
 
Peter – Me and some other people actually moved there.  Although it was stupid 
because I was working and I would go there for supper.  It was interesting 
because there some blood-red incandescent Marxist guys from Paris 68 who 
                                                 
189
 “Citizen drive stalls parking lot project,” The Gazette, June 10, 1975. A more detailed 
renovation plan was showcased at a nearby community centre in order to better inform the public 
of the possibility: “Projet de renovation,” La Presse, July 12, 1975. 
190
 Provincial designations were accompanied by a 500 foot heritage radius, the limits of which 
would have provided the St-Norbert homes with a modicum of protection. 
191
 “Rue Saint-Norbert: la guerre ouverte,” Le Jour, July 31, 1975. 
192
 Richard Huot  “Rue Saint-Norbert: La police arête 6 occupants,” Le Devoir, August 2, 1975. 
193
 “Rue St-Norbert: l’eau est coupée,” La Jour, August 2, 1975. 
194
 Jane Broderick. 
  
60 
were, you know, who really believed we had to throw down the whole system and 
when the system was destroyed something better, something really 
communist…anyway, but they were very good.  They were Frenchmen, they 
weren’t Québécois and they, you want 20 posters?  Fuck, they could make 20 
posters in a day.  You want supper for 85 people?  No problem, we know how to 
make supper, in the street, for 85 people.195 
 
The Save Montrealers were joined by representatives of other advocacy groups, 
staying at St-Norbert on a rotating basis.  The squat also attracted committed Marxists, 
both local and international in origin.  Housing was an issue that drew support from a 
wide array of individuals of varying political leanings.  In form, this protest differed greatly 
from others.  Occupying buildings deviated from more traditional pressure tactics such 
as letter-writing, petitions, and articles.  The radical presence spoke to the prevalence of 
Marxist thought during the 1970s.196 In conversation, the Save Montrealers considered 
the radicals’ commitment to the homes secondary to their desire for confrontation.197 
Although both groups considered the St-Norbert circumstances shameful, their 
objectives diverged, revealing divisions within the activist community.  Despite these 
differences, the Save Montrealers felt a degree of camaraderie between themselves and 
the other squatters; an uneasy affiliation that produced a modicum of respect.  However, 
despite this show of solidarity, the homes fate was sealed.  On August 1st, the city 
expropriated the homes and cut their utilities.  By the end of the month, demolition work 
had begun and the block was quickly dismantled.198 
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Reporting on the St-Norbert circumstances, La Presse made reference to a 
climate of fear felt by residents in targeted areas.199 Downtown redevelopment was 
having an overly detrimental impact on the housing available to Montrealers, 
exacerbating a crisis that had continued unabated for many years.  In central Montreal, 
where the St-Norbert homes were situated, 57% of homes were lost over a twenty-year 
period (1961-1981).200 Other, lower-income areas were hit just as hard.  From 1961-
1971 Pointe-Saint-Charles lost 900 units, Saint-Henri: 2700, and Mile End: 1000.201  The 
housing crisis affected families the most.  In central Montreal, 60% of all housing was 
units of 3.5 or smaller, leaving much of the central area suited only for single or double-
occupants.202 Public housing units in the city had a waiting list of 6,000 people; old age 
homes had a waiting list of 2,024 people.203 When new housing was constructed, it often 
resulted in higher rents or values, leaving a growing number of residents unable to afford 
newly available units.204 
Given the dire circumstances facing inner-city residents, the decision to demolish 
standing homes left the Save Montrealers dumfounded:  
Jane - You know it was really bizarre to tear down a row of housing.  I still don’t 
understand what was really going on behind, whether that was the real plan or 
whether there was a big developer, and we just didn’t know about it, you know.205 
 
                                                 
199
 Claude Turcotte, “Les démolitions à Montréal: La bataille continue sur plusieurs fronts,” La 
Presse, June 5, 1975. 
200
 Francine Dansereau, Habiter au centre: Tendances et perspectives socio-économiques de 
l’habitation dans l’arrondissement Centre, (Montreal: Institut national de la recherché scientifique, 
1988), 18. The area in question roughly corresponds to the present-day Ville-Marie Borough. 
201
 Richard Morin, “Déclin, réaménagement et reanimation d’un quartier ancient de Montréal,” 
Urban History Review 17 (1988), 34. 
202
 Dansereau, Habiter au centre, 35. 
203
 Julia Weller, “The occupation of St. Norbert Street,” The Gazette. August 30, 1975. 
204
 This was a trend throughout Quebec.  In 1971, 35% of renters did not have to spend more 
than 30% of their income on rental units.  By 1983 that number had dropped to 15% of renters. 
Morin, “Déclin, réaménagement”, 38.  
205
 Jane Broderick. 
  
62 
Contributing to this disbelief was the fact that the St-Norbert homes were eliminated for a 
municipal yard.  Despite this defeat, the housing crisis remained a key issue for Save 
Montreal, and one they would argue with increasing thoroughness. 
The following year, Save Montreal publications stressed the need for a new 
housing strategy.206 The ‘Housing Policy’ press release laid out, in specific detail, 
strategies and resolutions the three levels of government could adopt to thwart the 
wanton loss of adequate housing in the Montreal area.  “Montreal: City in Crisis!” 
provided figures detailing the loss of housing and parks, and the projects (Autoroute Ville 
Marie, Radio-Canada Complex, etc.) that necessitated such losses despite the 
abundance of parking lots that pockmarked the downtown area.  A colour-coded 
 
Illustration 3.1: Map of downtown Montreal on the back of a brochure made by 
Save Montreal.  The red areas indicate demolished sites c. 1976.207 
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pamphlet distributed by Save Montreal starkly identified how many buildings were lost to 
vacant lots.208  Mark London, having previously authored a study on available land in 
downtown Halifax, conducted a similar one for Montreal: 
Mark - I put that together, and we published it, and I would like to think that was 
one of the things that contributed to changing the dialogue.  Because the 
dialogue had been, sort of, preservation – the report was printed under the 
heading ‘Preservation and Development: There is Room for Both.209 
 
 Calculating the amount of land available and the rate of construction in downtown 
Montreal, Mark determined that “the available land would permit continued construction 
at the present rate for 120 years, with absolutely no demolition.” [Underline his]210 As 
Mark noted in conversation, the group’s intention was clear: to demonstrate demolition 
was not a requisite for new construction and that Save Montreal and related movements 
did not oppose new developments: 
Mark – Sort of like ‘Oh, you’re against development.’  And we’re saying ‘No, 
we’re not against development, but save the important buildings and 
streetscapes and neighbourhoods, and put the development in the empty land’, 
which was largely south of downtown.211 
 
 Adding to the absurdity of the debate was the fact that the municipal government 
had initiated home renovation programs in other areas of the city.  In an attempt to 
address the housing crisis, in 1972 the city launched a programme détaillé de renovation 
in the eastern Centre-Sud (also known as Sainte-Marie).  This program entailed the 
construction of new affordable housing and the restoration of existing housing stock.212 
Throughout the 1970s similar programs were established in other areas of the Centre-
Sud, as well as north Saint-Henri.  However, despite differing in appearance from major 
urban renewal projects, these projects still suffered from a lack of public consultation or 
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democratic engagement with existing residents and therefore deviated “as little as 
possible from earlier planning objectives”.213   
The St-Norbert homes most were likely casualties of their location.  Modernist 
ideology stressed the strict segregation between residential areas and 
commercial/industrial sectors.214 Since first elected, Drapeau conceived the city centre 
as a place for business and commerce, even going so far as to initially oppose 
Montreal’s first modernist housing complex, Habitations Jeannce-Mance due to its 
central location.215 The St-Norbert homes, resembling the “taudis” Drapeau railed so 
hard against, stood little chance against this planning philosophy. 
 In many ways the St-Norbert fight resembled citizen-lead housing initiatives in 
other parts of North America.  In Toronto, reformist politicians, activists and local 
residents acted in concert to establish urban renovation projects for areas such as 
Trefann Court and Don Vale.  With citizen consultation, existing homes were restored 
and new homes built to scale all the while retaining existing street patterns.216 
Meanwhile, in 1970s Brooklyn newly-arrived middle-class professionals joined with 
existing residents to oppose urban renewal plans for their brownstone 
neighbourhoods.217 These battles constituted a new conceptualization of urban life that 
favoured the retention of existing structures as a precondition for neighbourhood 
livability. 
 In subsequent years, housing remained a priority for Save Montreal and its 
members, many of whom were involved in creating the Milton-Park co-operative, the 
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largest co-operative in Canada at that time.  Lucia Kowaluk and Dimitri Roussopoulos 
had been prominent members in the Milton-Park Citizens Committee since their arrival in 
the neighbourhood in 1971.218 Phyllis Lambert and Heritage Montreal played a pivotal 
role in obtaining federal support for the co-operative.  In addition, Adele Mardoche and 
Joshua Wolfe were both involved in the formation of Milton-Parc as well as being long-
time residents. 
 While Save Montreal considered “the housing situation…the most critical issue in 
Montreal”,219 it was far from being the group’s sole concern.  Elsewhere in the city, 
structures occupying more prominent spaces were under similar developmental 
pressure.  Despite their historic, social or economic importance, Montreal’s civic 
authorities considered their value equally nebulous. 
 
The Laurentien Hotel, 1974-1977 
 
Lonnie - There were so many different areas of the city that were being affected.  
We felt we had to act while the hotel, the old hotel at the corner of Dorchester 
was being demolished.220 
 
 The hotel at the corner of Peel and Dorchester was the Laurentien Hotel.  Built in 
1948, the 1,004-room building’s architecture displayed a fusion of late-art deco and 
modernist elements.  Canadian Pacific Ltd. (CP), having purchased the building from the 
Sheraton Hotel chain in 1969, was intent on replacing the hotel with an office tower,221 a 
proposal the Friends of Windsor Station had been contesting since 1970.222  However by 
1974, despite interest from the Bank of Montreal, no concrete action had taken place.  
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Nonetheless, CP reiterated its intention to raze the hotel the following year.223 Save 
Montreal responded with a press conference communicating its opposition to the hotel’s 
demolition, and called upon municipal, provincial and federal authorities to intervene.224 
Despite CP’s intentions, numerous demolition delays ensued.  The hotel was granted a 
reprieve following the Bank of Montreal’s withdrawal from the project.  During this time 
provincial bodies also advocated deferral.  The upcoming 1976 Olympic Games required 
considerable accommodations in the city for games-related staff.  The Olympic 
Organizing Committee and the provincial Olympic housing bureau wanted the building to 
house the international press corps.225  These delays provided time for Save Montreal to 
better mount their campaign.  However, as interviewees recounted, the Laurentien Hotel 
posed specific challenges: 
Michael – Anyway, I knew that demolishing the Laurentien Hotel, which was just 
like a big bachelor apartment, was a stupid idea.  It was, comparatively speaking, 
brand new and it had to be making a lot of money.  Anyway, nobody liked it 
because it was art deco.226 
  
Peter - Michael got all excited about it and said it was a wonderful example of 
post-war architecture and there was some amazing innovations, and the 
bathrooms in each room.  But, a hard sell.  Nobody…most people couldn’t really 
see it as a historic monument, or a monument of architecture and this or 
whatever.  Because, it was even hard to tell people, at that time that Grey Nuns, 
for instance, was an important monument.  And, I see in these clippings that the 
Chamber of Commerce of Montreal - I don’t know if you’ve come across those 
Chamber of Commerce – when, just at the end of the Grey Nuns campaign, 
came out with very strong statements against classification and saying that the 
city should not be a museum of architectural monuments and the city is an arena 
for real estate development and that’s what it’s for!  So, even Grey Nuns wasn’t 
easy to promote and the Laurentien Hotel was less so.227 
 
Josh – So the Laurentien Hotel was kind of unusual for Save Montreal because 
it was neither – well it was affordable hotel accommodations in downtown, so 
there was some question of social aspects, but not for Montrealers, for tourists – 
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so it wasn't an architectural monument, it wasn't particularly important 
architecturally, nor was it a charming neighbourhood.228 
 
 As Peter noted in conversation, if it was difficult to build awareness for prominent 
buildings of historical significance, than it was even more so for structures of post-war 
vintage.  Josh voiced similar sentiments, pointing out that the hotel did not fit the building 
or streetscape profile Save Montreal was accustomed to campaigning for.  Furthermore, 
Josh felt the social benefits of the hotel mostly benefited visitors to the city, rather than 
the residents themselves.  Nonetheless, the members of Save Montreal engaged in a 
multi-year, protracted campaign to save the building.  Arguments were mostly rooted in 
the negative economic impact the hotel’s demolition would cause.   
Centrally located in downtown Montreal, the hotel remained a profitable 
enterprise.  Sheraton Hotels, which had continued to rent and operate the Laurentien, 
was “delighted” by CP’s decision to delay demolition identifying the hotel as “one of the 
biggest money-makers in the company” ranking “among the top five hotels” within their 
350 hotel chain.229 Save Montreal highlighted how the hotel catered to many tourists by 
offering low-cost accommodations, and proved especially popular with bus tours, 
receiving “40 to 50 bus tours a week in peak season, more than any other hotel in North 
America.”230 In conversation, Michael related how members of the tourist bureau spoke 
to him and “practically wept that this thing was going to be gone because they didn’t 
have another hotel at that price level that would keep these people in town for another 
day.”231 The loss of so many inexpensive rooms would contribute to an overall inflation in 
hotel room costs in Montreal.232  
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   Having spoken with tourism industry insiders, Save Montreal claimed that the 
hotel’s demolition would also adversely affect the city’s convention business.  With 
convention organizers requesting “a certain percentage of budget-rooms in a city”,233 a 
Convention and Visitors’ Bureau representative estimated the loss of 10 conventions per 
year as a result of demolition.234 In addition, Save Montreal identified the negative impact 
demolition would have on surrounding businesses.  A September 1975 fire necessitated 
the temporary closure of the hotel.  Local businesses were impacted by the decision, 
and eagerly waited its reopening.235 Considering the building’s size, and the fact that it 
was a relatively recent construction that had undergone further renovation following the 
1975 blaze, Save Montreal members considered it an eminent waste of money and 
resources.  Armed with these arguments, Save Montreal utilized many tactics to 
pressure CP into preserving the hotel, some of which were recalled in conversation:  
Lonnie – And we got out there and marched in the street, and we wore garbage 
bags over us {laughter} to protest what was happening.  We wrote letters to the 
editor saying “What was this building, they just put million of dollars into 
renovating it and now they’re tearing it down.  It was an inexpensive hotel for a 
lot of people that was right in the centre of the city.236 
 
Lucia – And we had a vigil, it was in the fall – pretty sure it was the fall.  It was 
cold, but not bitter.  We stood in a line, spelled each other off.  Maybe there were 
20 of us, off and on, for a whole day to call attention to the fact we considered it a 
huge wasted of a building, of energy, to tear that building down.  We even all 
bought shares in Canadian Pacific.  So we went to the annual meeting and just, 
you know, said we don’t agree, why are you tearing down this building, and so on 
and so forth.  But they tore it down anyway…237 
 
Everything from meetings with city and provincial officials, to letter writing and 
media pressure, to absurdist street performances and song-writing (The Laurentien 
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Song), was employed as a means of calling attention to the issue.238  The donning of 
garbage bags that Lonnie described spoke to the cavalier manner in which the city and 
developers disposed of buildings.  The final acts of protest were perhaps the most 
daring.  Having purchased shares in CP, Save Montreal filed a brief to the Quebec 
Superior Court asking the company, and its developmental subsidiary Marathon 
Realties, be enjoined from demolishing the structure.239 The brief “contends that the 
defendants…are acting in a manner which is ‘oppressive and fraudulent’, and prejudicial 
to the interest of its shareholders” and that the “demolition would be a ‘flagrant waste of 
a productive and remunerative asset of the defendants, and would unjustifiably diminish 
the value of the shares’ held by Save Montreal.”240 However, by the time the brief was 
filed in February, 1977 demolition work had already commenced.  Despite deliberation, 
the judge ruled that a request for injunction “to halt demolition was useless since the 
building was effectively destroyed.” In one last attempt to sway CP, members of Save 
Montreal attended the shareholders meeting and submitted questions to the chairman 
asking why the hotel was being demolished and countering the claims that the hotel was 
losing money.  Nonetheless, despite the group’s best efforts, demolition work continued 
and the hotel was demolished. 
The Laurentien Hotel, as a subject of a prolonged preservation campaign, is 
interesting for what it is not.  As a recent construction, it lacked historicity, depriving its 
advocates of one means of defence.  Speaking to The Gazette Michael Fish pointed out 
that “the Laurentien doesn’t have a particular historic or cultural significance and it isn’t a 
neighbourhood”.241 The hotel’s lack of heritage credentials camouflaged the building’s 
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importance.  Even today, despite being one of the group’s central campaigns, the fight 
over the Laurentien Hotel receives scant attention, receiving only brief mention in 
Drouin’s history of Montreal’s preservation movement.242  
 
Illustration 3.2: Flyer for a Laurentien Hotel campaign fundraiser.243 
Despite this challenge, Save Montreal understood the building for what it 
represented to its staff, neighbours, and the city as a whole.  By outlining an economic 
argument, Save Montreal wanted the city’s residents, politicians and business 
community to rethink how Montreal was being developed and to reflect on the 
schizophrenic demolition/construction cycle that was unsustainable and economically 
detrimental to the city centre.  
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Shaughnessy House and the Grey Nuns, 1974-1976 
 
 Of the campaigns under discussion, the threats posed to the Shaughnessy 
house and the Grey Nuns motherhouse are perhaps the most indicative of the attitudes 
and times in which Save Montreal operated.  Both buildings were aesthetically and 
architecturally representative of Montreal’s pre-war built character, and both were 
associated with important figures in Montreal’s development; Thomas Shaughnessy and 
the Sisters of Charity of Montreal, widely-known by their moniker the Grey Nuns.  
Despite these impressive credentials, both structures were threatened with demolition by 
large developers.  In both cases, Save Montreal campaigned for their preservation and 
the buildings received designations as Cultural Property from the provincial government 
in 1974 and 1976, respectively. 
 The Shaughnessy house, built in 1876, was bought by Thomas Shaughnessy, 
assistant general manager, and later president, of the CPR. 244 Its location at Dorchester 
and Rue St-Mathieu had once been a fashionable area replete with mansions of similar 
elegance.  Many had been lost though, the result of the Ville-Marie Expressway 
punching holes in the neighbourhood’s fabric.  Demolition for high-rise development was 
also rampant in this area of downtown.  
Brian Merrett, having grown up in the area came to be familiar with the building 
and, through contact with the religious order, the Sisters of Service, who owned the 
premises was given access to photograph its interiors: 
Brian – And, I went into this wonderful house and I saw this great Victorian 
house and it was big and beautiful woodwork and stained-glass and I asked the 
nuns “Can I, you know” - I didn't say I was a photographer right off, I said student 
of architecture - “could I photograph in the house?”. “Oh yes, sure” they said “but 
please don't show your photographs to the press because, you know, the house 
is being sold, it's going to be torn down, they're going to build a hotel here.” So, 
talk about the influence of photography and a very important person which came 
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into play here. Over  a couple of days in May 1973 I went into the house, again a 
small format camera, tripod, photographed interiors, details, the architecture and 
the spaces. Great, you know, fire places, stained-glass..great house but no, I 
wasn't to show it to the media and there were two people in the media, one at the 
Montreal Star, one at the Gazette who were really itching to get their hands on 
the photographs and I wasn't allowed to show them to them. At that time, a friend 
of mine told me about an architect who moved back to Montreal from Chicago 
and she was interested in preserving architecture.245 
 
 This proved fortuitous because later in the year, and only 10 days after the Van 
Horne mansion demolition, the building was threatened.246 A Toronto developer wished 
to purchase the house and replace it with an 11-storey tower.  Sensing an opportunity, 
Mark London approached the developer with an idea: 
Mark – And at the same time after work, like this is what I was doing for my day 
job, but my evening job we would go to these Save Montreal meetings.  And then 
the Shaughnessy House was threatened and, again, I said ‘There’s a lot of room 
on that property, why are they tearing down this beautiful house!  Why don’t they 
build the hotel behind the house and they could save the house, and use the 
house for the… 
Eliot – Like as a lobby. 
Mark – Meeting rooms, dining hall of the hotel, and it would be really classy.247 
 
 The proposal would have seen the house retained and incorporated into a hotel 
facility.  The spacious interior was well-suited to the dining and conference needs of a 
hotel.  At the same time, the federal government expressed interest in designating the 
building as a site of national importance and did so later that year.248 However, the 
developer opted to pass on the hotel proposal: 
Mark – And, I think we asked the developer, they weren’t interested.  So we were 
trying to get it classified by the province of Quebec as an historic property, which 
would mean they weren’t allowed to demolish it.  And the Ministry of Cultural 
Affairs official said ‘Look, the nuns have sold it, and the nuns need the revenue.  
If you can find someone who would be willing to buy the property…249 
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At the time Mark was working for the architectural firm ARCOP and in Halifax on 
assignment.  The developer coordinating the Halifax project with ARCOP was Y & R 
Realities whom Mark approached with the same hotel proposal: 
Mark – I approached the developers and they said ‘Hey, there’s this property in 
downtown Montreal, it costs x amount of dollars, would you be interesting in 
developing a hotel here?  Save the building, build it.’  And they came, and they 
looked at it, and they were interested.  So we put together this deal, and the 
Ministry of Cultural Affairs was going to classify it.250 
 
 Again, the developer declined, leaving the house’s fate still uncertain.  Luckily, 
having been introduced to the house by Brian Merrett, Phyllis Lambert agreed to 
purchase the building. 
Brian – So, I met Phyllis Lambert and, at my apartment on St-Marc Street. 
Trotted out all these photographs and laid them on the table and she took a set 
of photographs away with her. And, it took a few years, the next year she 
purchased the house, a few years later she converted it into the CCA and built all 
the buildings around it. So, talk about the impact of photography – that, that I 
think was probably the most powerful project that I worked on...251 
 
 Phyllis Lambert, a member of Montreal’s prominent and wealthy Bronfman 
family, was uniquely positioned for such an acquisition.  An architect by training, she had 
been instrumental in the design of prominent modernist structures in New York and 
Montreal (the Seagram Building and the Segal Centre respectively).  Despite her 
pedigree, fellow Save Montrealers insist that Lambert was a member on par with the rest 
of the group and many were unaware of her familial connections for some time.  
Nonetheless, the resources at her disposal were, at times, beneficial to the organization, 
although this was mostly consigned to financial assistance for day-to-day activities.  In 
this instance, Lambert had the ability to acquire the home.  While this was not 
necessarily done on Save Montreal’s behalf, it was nevertheless bought to ensure the 
building was retained.  
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Having purchased the house and, following a few years of deliberation, Lambert 
decided to build the Canadian Centre for Architecture on the site, utilizing the 
Shaughnessy House as an office, reception, and conference area.  The interior details 
were retained with minimal changes while the sensitive rear attachment connects the 
building with the rest of the centre.  The house was also designated as a cultural 
property by the provincial government in 1974.  
Located a few blocks east of the Shaughnessy house stands the Grey Nuns 
motherhouse.  Founded in 1738 by Marie-Marguerite d’Youville, the Grey Nuns came to 
operate the Montreal General Hospital and were a prominent institution in the Montreal 
community for many years.  Their second motherhouse was constructed in 1871 and 
designed by renowned ecclesiastical architect Victor Bourgeau.252  Since 1973, there 
had been reports of a possible sale to a developer.253  By 1974 news of the sale were 
leaked, the nuns were considering selling their property to a developer, Valorinvest.254  
Valorinvest was the Canadian affiliate of the Swiss bank Soginvest Banca S.A. and a 
significant real estate management company in the Montreal area.255 Details of the 
development were mostly in the form of rumours, but Peter had a fortunate connection 
who disclosed the transaction: 
Peter –  …but it started with a rumour that Grey Nuns had been sold, or had 
been optioned but nobody knew anything about it.  However, my father had been 
a florist and there was a florist on Guy Street, on the property…I went to the 
florist who ran this little store and I introduced myself.  And he said ‘Oh yeah, 
yeah, I’ve known Mr. Lanken from a long time ago’.  So I said ‘Look, there’s 
some rumours about this property’ and he said ‘Yeah, within the last month we’ve 
been told to pay our rent to a company called Valorinvest’ and that was the first 
time, I believe, that the name Valorinvest emerged and suddenly, suddenly there 
was an objective!256 
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Phyllis Lambert tried to purchase the convent, but her offer was rejected since 
Valorinvest submitted a higher bid.257 Initially the provincial Minister of Cultural Affairs, 
Denis Hardy, designated the motherhouse’s central chapel as Cultural Property.258 This 
hardly quelled the issue.  Hardy was then under pressure to designate the entire 
structure while Valorinvest was lobbying for demolition approval as the chapel’s 
designation provided a protective radius of 500 metres; any development that fell within 
that radius was subject to provincial approval.259 
Looking to keep the pressure on Hardy to designate the entire complex, Save 
Montreal stepped up its efforts.  In January, 1975 a series of ads, in French and English, 
circulated throughout newspapers.  The ads had been conceived by Phyllis Lambert who 
utilized personal connections to have them printed: 
Phyllis – I went to, because of my family, I knew some of the people in 
advertising and I went to the advertising firm and I said ‘I need – I did it again for 
the mountain… 
Eliot – Ok. 
Phyllis – And I said ‘We need to have an ad.’  So I think we raised money to put 
it in papers, but they did this for us, you know, without any charge and pro bono I 
suppose is the term one uses.  Yeah, yeah, yeah, they want to shoot our dearest 
treasure.  And the Grey Nuns in the gun sight, yes, yes, and we had a pamphlet, 
and I mean a little ticket at the bottom to send to Quebec, because that was the 
only way you could save anything, you had to get things classified with a 500-foot 
area around from the farthest edges of the entity to be classified.  And we used 
that strategically to cover areas of the town.  But we sent these coupons up to 
Quebec and, you know, we brought the coupons to drugstores everywhere.  And 
people filled these in, you know, we raised the flag and people came.260 
 
The ads depicted the motherhouse in crosshairs framed by the words “They’re 
ready to blast one of Montreal’s most precious treasures” “Your silence is their best 
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weapon.”261 The ad included a cut-out letter to be signed and mailed to Hardy asking him 
to classify the entire structure.  As always, Save Montreal was prepared with counter 
proposals.  It was suggested that the federal government take over the building for office 
space, a solution that would alleviate the need for the proposed Guy-Favreau complex, a 
project that Save Montreal was also campaigning against.262 Save Montreal prompted 
Concordia University to explore the possibility of purchasing the site.263 Peter Lanken 
was asked to provide some drawings concerning the possibilities for the building in their 
university magazine.  Arguments made by Save Montreal and other groups stressed the 
historical significance of the project.  Michael Fish called the proposal “un saccage de 
notre patrimoine” and that such a project would not be tolerated in a European city.264  
The project remained in the media for months as Hardy and the provincial 
government deliberated over a decision.  Finally, on June 10, 1975 Hardy announced his 
decision, Valorinvest’s proposal was rejected due to the negative impact the plan would 
have on the site.265 It was a victory for the preservation efforts, but it did not protect the 
convent indefinitely, Valorinvest could return with a different plan for the site.  However, 
that was not to be the case.  Following a cabinet shuffle Jean-Paul L’Allier replaced 
Denis Hardy as Minister of Cultural Affairs and in January 1976, L’Allier announced that 
the entire Grey Nuns motherhouse would be classified as a Cultural Property.266 
While the other campaigns discussed in this paper represent defeats or partial 
victories, the Grey Nuns motherhouse and Shaughnessy house represent important 
victories for the group, especially considering their current prominence.  The members of 
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Save Montreal were quick to recognize the possibilities at each site and advocated 
initiatives that would retain the heritage structures while allowing for new, innovative 
uses.  In both instances Save Montreal engaged in negotiations with public and private 
bodies to protect noteworthy buildings.  
Alternative positions responded to the concerns of both property owners and 
advocated, in the case of the Shaughnessy House, a sensitive incorporation of the 
building into a hotel and, with regards to the Grey Nuns complex, its adoption by either 
the federal government or Concordia to meet their respective spatial needs.  
Furthermore, their current status – the Shaughnessy House has been sensitively 
incorporated into the Canadian Centre for Architecture to serve as office, meeting and 
event space, while the Grey Nuns motherhouse (in what is, perhaps, a testament to 
Save Montreal’s forward-thinking) has been converted to student residences and study 
space by Concordia University – speaks to Save Montreal’s promotion of preservation 
and reuse over demolition and redevelopment. 
 
Place Guy-Favreau, 1972-1984 
 
Mark – And the federal government was going to, originally they were going to 
have offices in Complexe Desjardins but then they pulled out, and they were 
building a federal building, what eventually became Complexe Guy-Favreau.267 
 
Complexe Guy-Favreau was first announced to the public in 1972 as a “$100 
million, multi-tower service complex” that would “centralize federal government services 
in Montreal.”268 At the press conference, Drapeau claimed “that in terms of development, 
the 1970’s in Montreal would be ‘more sensational’ than the 1960’s”.269 The Minister of 
Public Works Jean-Eudes Dubé expressed hope that the “project will encourage more 
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developments in the eastern section of downtown Montreal”.270 Drapeau had long 
advocated for an eastern pole to Montreal’s downtown area and reiterated this belief by 
claiming “the only way we can make Montreal one of the greatest cities in the world is by 
ensuring there are no gaps between the eastern and western sections of the city”.271 The 
federal government was in agreement, the Ministry of Public Works having chosen that 
location in support of downtown Montreal’s eastern development.272 Complexe Guy-
Favreau’s construction would also be the latest node in the spatial redevelopment of an 
area extending south from Boulevard de Maisonneuve to the borders of Old Montreal.  
The area’s rationalization required the replacement of ageing, low-income housing with 
megastructures, producing a series of four interconnected complexes with rapid transit 
access.  The size and scope of the project would further acknowledge Boulevard René-
Lévesque as an avenue of major office complexes.  Furthermore, there were political 
considerations at play.  The complex “was conceived to bring more than 10,000 federal 
civil servants under one roof, thus asserting the physical as well as symbolic presence of 
the federal government in the city and the province.”273 
Standing in Guy Favreau’s way was the area housing Montreal’s historic Chinese 
population.  Like other Chinatowns, the neighbourhood was “known to maintain and 
support a marginal population: the elderly and the poor, handicapped by linguistic, 
cultural and psychological barriers.”274 Under developmental pressure since the opening 
of the Hydro-Québec headquarters in 1962, the neighbourhood suffered further 
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encroachment by the construction of Complexe Desjardins.  The plans for Guy-Favreau 
called for the demolition of churches and private residences in the neighbourhood’s 
western end.  Following its announcement, Chinatown community leaders denounced 
the impending expropriations claiming they “would destroy not only present 
achievements but the community’s ever-increasing development.”275 Removal of the 
institutional structures, community leaders argued, would hamper the community’s ability 
to function, reducing it to an area delineated solely by consumption.  In addition, the 
possibility of future expansion of the complex called into question the entire 
neighbourhood’s existence.276  
Over the ensuing years, Save Montreal employed a variety of arguments against 
both the project and its proposed location.  Of immediate concern was the cloud of 
secrecy surrounding Guy-Favreau’s status.  Repeated attempts by members of Save 
Montreal to speak with Public Works officials regarding the project were ignored.277 In a 
letter discussing Guy-Favreau, Save Montreal stated that while developers were 
“especially secretive…the worst offenders in this regard in our city are government 
departments who have no justification for secrecy.”278 It was considered especially 
egregious that a governmental body, entrusted to operate on the public’s behalf, was 
operating confidentially on this file.  In a Gazette article, Lucia Kowaluk argued that the 
ongoing construction of new office buildings necessitated the demolition of existing, 
moderately-priced, commercial building stock.  New office space is inevitably more 
expensive, Kowaluk argued, contributing to an overall inflation in commercial rents in the 
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city, a situation that was without warrant when considering the vacancies in other, newly-
built office complexes.279 
The project’s design was also a source of chagrin for the Save Montrealers as 
noted by Lucia and Mark: 
Lucia – So buildings were torn down for it and it was to be all government 
buildings and luxury condos.280 
 
Mark – And the original design of that wiped out absolutely everything in 
Chinatown and was this huge, this huge box, like totally, I mean it’s already a bit 
out of scale the way it ended up being, but it was, like, 10 times bigger.281 
 
From a social standpoint, Lucia was angered by the demolition of existing homes so that 
government workers could be housed instead.  The original design, Mark noted, would 
have eliminated most of Chinatown, its scale dwarfing any remaining buildings, and 
thereby undermining the neighbourhood’s structural and social components. 
 In January 1976 the federal government temporarily suspended plans for the 
complex in order to accommodate design changes and to compensate for any potential 
work shortages.  If the construction industry slumped following the Olympic Games the 
complex could be pushed forward.282 Despite the suspension a significant section of 
Chinatown had already been levelled, leaving only eight buildings remaining in the 
neighbourhood’s western section.283 
 Throughout 1976 and 1977 Save Montreal helped keep the project in the 
limelight demanding that it be reduced in size and scope, existing buildings be 
integrated, and federal government offices be decentralized.284 Furthermore, 
governmental devotion to megastructures, they argued, produced a “construction 
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industry of artificially inflated size which is oriented almost exclusively to large projects” 
and that “this oversized labour force is being used to justify projects like Place Guy 
Favreau”.285  
 These arguments were communicated in meetings with newly-appointed Minister 
of Public Works André Ouellet.286 In the following press conference Ouellet outlined 
changes to the original Guy-Favreau plans, namely the reduction in size from three-
towers to two 12-storey towers, and the incorporation of social housing.  Furthermore, 
the government also committed to refurbishing existing federal buildings to house certain 
ministries rather than relocate them to Guy-Favreau.  Ouellet also indicated that the 
design was the result of consultation with Save Montreal and other groups.287 
 At the same press conference, Ouellet also promised to form a public 
consultation committee and incorporate its recommendations into the design.  However, 
the committee proved to be an incredibly frustrating experience.  As indicated in three 
damning SOS Montreal articles, the committee lacked authority, its members were 
ambivalent at best, and it served as a buffer between the organization and the 
governmental decision-makers.288  With further demolitions in west Chinatown, it was 
clear the process was a charade.  However, as Lucia noted in conversation, subsidized 
housing, not even on the drawing board when the project was announced, remains a 
feature of the complex.  The southern face of Guy-Favreau more closely resembles a 
traditional streetscape than the monumental atrium that graces its northern entrance.  
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The efforts of Save Montreal were not all for naught, an opinion held by many of its 
members: 
Lucia – And we also, Save Montreal fought hard to get the government to have a 
certain amount of subsidized housing in it, which we succeeded in doing.289 
 
Mark – And I remember meeting, Save Montreal.  I think maybe Peter was there, 
I don’t remember, maybe Michael, a few of us.  But I put together the 10 reasons 
why Complexe Guy-Favreau, I don’t know if it even had that name then, should 
not be built.  Or should not be built the way it was being proposed.  We proposed 
that it be scaled down, more mixed-use, have housing, be smaller scale on La 
Gauchetière, be more respectful of Chinatown, and we met the André Ouellet, 
and he was very sympathetic, they ended up totally redesigning the building 
pretty much along the guidelines – pretty much, it’s still a big complex – but pretty 
much along the guidelines we had recommended.290 
 
 When the complex opened in 1984, reviews were decidedly mixed.  Architecture 
professor Jean-Claude Marsan summarized it best, arguing that the building “a perdu sa 
raison d’être”.291 Conceived over a period of 15 years, and subject to considerable 
revisions, it was a building that spanned two eras; that of the megastructure, and that of 
sensitive integration into the surrounding urban setting.  Save Montreal, through its 
dogged opposition to the project, helped persuade the federal authorities of a need for a 
building that was more respectful to the neighbourhood it had so insensitively 
encroached upon.  Furthermore, although the public consultation committee was for 
optics only, it was an early instance of such a committee being held.   
Although much of Chinatown was lost, the intervention of Save Montreal and 
other groups ensured that matters relating to heritage, housing and the local economy 
were at the forefront of public debate.  Like the St-Norbert street protests, opposition to 
the Guy-Favreau complex further demonstrated Save Montreal’s willingness to advocate 
on behalf of an impoverished area.  By arguing for the safeguarding of Chinatown, Save 
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Montreal again exhibited its ability and to advocate for spaces that fell beyond Montreal’s 
Anglo-Victorian pedigree. 
 
Walking Tours, 1976-1988292 
 
In 1976 Save Montreal began hosting walking tours of various neighbourhoods in 
the city.  These tours were not, by definition, campaigns but they represent an important 
counterpoint to the group’s preservation efforts; the walking tours demonstrated what 
Save Montreal stood for, as opposed to what they stood against.  It is important to 
remember that Save Montreal was a multi-faceted organization and, while it often acted 
as a protest group, its members also sought to educate Montreal residents about their 
own city.  Some members were far more active in raising community awareness than in 
organizing protests. 
 The walking tours were first proposed by Norman Spatz: 
 
Norman – And the one idea I’m extremely proud of was I, at that time, went and 
visited a friend who was living in Chicago, which has the Chicago Architectural 
Assocation, and they offer a series of walking tours, and it occurred to me that 
we should offer a series of walking tours.  And so I was actually the developer of 
what has morphed into the Heritage Montreal walking tour program.  And I 
started in, I guess, 76 or something.  And we had, like, three walking tours and it 
was a lot of work, and I did it for about two or three years...293 
 
The Chicago Architecture Foundation that Norman referred to was founded as the 
Chicago School of Architecture Foundation in 1966 by local architects looking to save 
the John Glessner house from demolition.294 Following their initial success the 
organization began hosting annual walking tours in 1970, and has since expanded to 
include exhibitions, river cruises, and community programs.295 
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While Norman remembered some initial opposition to the idea, the walking tours’ 
composition ensured the values and objectives of Save Montreal were well-represented.  
A newspaper article highlighting the Chinatown tour summarized these objectives as 
such: 
“The basic aim of Save Montreal’s free walking tours is to show Montrealers their 
city in a new light – to explore with them unfamiliar and interesting areas, and 
also to point out sections which face demolition and development.”296 
 
The tours deliberately focused on areas frequently neglected by the city.  The Little 
Burgundy tour opened with a three-page history of the area, imbuing it with a sense of 
character and repudiating the notion that low-wage neighbourhoods were inherent 
blights on the urban fabric.  The introduction ended with reference to the city’s 
redevelopment of the area, citing “the final effects of the programme are not yet known, 
but one thing is certain: the population is rapidly declining.  We will speak much more 
about the City’s programme throughout this tour.”297 What followed was a fascinating mix 
of historical contextualization, architectural highlights, current circumstances, and social 
commentary, ensuring the pressures facing the neighbourhood and its residents were 
the central theme.298   
Much like the Little Burgundy tour, the tour of the Main/St-Laurent also 
prominently featured those who lived and worked in the neighbourhood.  Despite a lack 
of material resources, Caroline and others were able to create these tours through 
contact with residents and small shop owners who provided them with information on 
neighbourhood life and the origins of their businesses: 
Caroline – Oh yeah, it was really folksy.  I went and spoke to all sorts of owners 
like Berson, who owned the Hebrew monument maker…“Right, the gravestones.  
St. Lawrence Bakery existed in those days.  Simcha, which was a little grocery 
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store at the corner of Napoleon.  I went into so many of those stores and 
interviewed the owners.  And, made a walking tour and we offered this walking 
tour and it was a huge success.  A lot of people...it must have been one of the 
first that was free…299 
 
Throughout our conversation Caroline described these tours as “folksy”, “granola” and 
“amateur” signifying members’ initial inexperience in conducting tours.  However, the ad 
hoc method by which they developed the tours may have contributed to their success.  
In the case of the Main tour, many individuals came from more suburban areas to 
acquaint themselves with the old Jewish quarter in which their grandparents had 
resided.  Caroline recalled how the walking tour provided an opportunity to learn about 
both their city and own family story:300 
Caroline – I mean, and they were staggered.  They were staggered because 
they could see that what they considered a slum area now was in.  And this was 
just the beginning. 
Eliot - Ok, ok. 
Caroline – Of it being in.  Prince Arthur was just starting to be developed.  The 
Bas St-Louis, and I don’t even know if it’s still there, on the south side of Prince 
Arthur at St-Dominique was the first restaurant.  He’d taken over from an old fish 
shop. 
Eliot – Ok. 
Caroline – And, so it was really fun for these people who lived in all the Jewish 
suburbs, you know?  And were coming back and rediscovering their roots, a lot 
of them.  So that was one of the activities.  And it was our first walking tour, 
definitely was.  There was information about the architecture, how much 
information was there?  I mean, I research and write and give lectures on history 
and architecture but in those days the information we had, there wasn’t an 
internet, we didn’t have this kind of information available.  It was very folksy.301 
  
In profiling the neighbourhood from a grassroots perspective, Caroline and others were 
not just illuminating the area’s past, but its present as well.  By showcasing a functioning, 
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populated neighbourhood these tours educated those unfamiliar or out of touch with their 
own city centre and countered modernist perceptions of inner-city blight. 
The content of these tours recalls Jacobs’ book The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities and its pervasive anecdotes of neighbourhood life.  For Jacobs, the 
contact that sidewalks and storefronts afford a community is necessary for fostering 
public safety, mutual respect, and common identity.302 In addition, by highlighting the 
architectural forms associated with early immigrant experiences, the walking tours also 
contributed to an ongoing rediscovery of the vernacular form already evidenced by such 
publications as Montréal en évolution (1974), Exploring Montreal (1974) and Lost 
Montreal (1975).  By profiling lost or threatened architectural heritage, these works 
advanced local understandings of place and neighbourhood, emphasizing the value of 
buildings of varying style and provenance. 
When questioned about the public’s response to the tours, Norman was 
emphatic: 
Norman – Oh, incredibly enthusiastic!  I mean, even given at the beginning a 
number of people said ‘No, no, no, this is a bad idea’, etc., no one complained 
after the first season. 
Eliot – Ok. 
Norman – I mean it was instant.  And the irony, again, was that we got more 
public response from the walking tour than we had done from protests… 
Eliot – Ok. 
Norman – Or from anything else.  I mean the public just flocked, and once you 
had them on the walking tour, you know, that was your opening to really change 
public opinion, which was ready to be changed.  I mean it was one of those 
fortuitous things.  I would like to be self-important and say ‘We changed!’  It was 
happening.  Whether we had been there for not, it was happening.  It was just a 
question of who.303 
 
Norman’s summation that ‘”it was happening” alludes to a growing disavowal of 
Montreal’s dispassionate, technocratic planning that undermined the very type of 
neighbourhoods the walking tours lionized.  Modernist architecture often ignored the 
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street, turning business and social life inwards, away from that component, the street, 
that Jacobs adroitly identified as being so necessary to the health of a city.  Save 
Montreal’s walking tours reacquainted residents with this dimension of their city, one 
their government had been so keen to forget.  That they were successful meant local 
mentalities were shifting; the old orthodoxies were giving way. 
 
Avenue McGill College, 1982-1985 
 
Mark – Well, there’s not much urban planning that had been done historically in 
Montreal.  But the one little piece of urban design that had been done is an 
architect – I think he was an architect or planner named Gréber, I believe – had 
done a design in - I don’t remember when it was, the 20s, the 30s, maybe the 
30s, the 40s - had proposed that McGill College would be a classical grand 
boulevard, sort of the Champs Elysées of Montreal.304 
 
Since 1926, there existed plans to widen Avenue McGill College.  As Mark noted 
in conversation, it was one of the few plans the city ever provisioned for.  From the gates 
of McGill University to the recently-completed Canadian National Station on Dorchester, 
McGill College was to be a broad, tree-lined boulevard; a prestige artery for the city.  
While the Great Depression and World War II put these designs on hold, they re-
emerged in the postwar period.305  The public square adjoining Place Ville-Marie 
represented what was to be the avenue’s southern terminus.  And while in subsequent 
years the city proceeded with the required expropriations,306 by 1983 the original plans 
for the avenue were in serious jeopardy.   
 The development firm Cadillac Fairview proposed to erect a shopping complex at 
the intersection of Ste-Catherine and McGill College.  The complex would house a 
symphony hall for the Montreal Symphony Orchestra as well as a cinema, theatre space 
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and 200 shopping units.  What made the scheme most controversial, though, was a 
proposed covered walkway across McGill College that would connect new shopping 
centre with the Simpson’s store in close proximity to the site.  The walkway, at 55 metres 
deep, was to be a large, bulky structure that would have blocked views of Montreal’s 
namesake mountain. 
Drapeau, in pursuit of a signature project, was asking, yet again, that all 
considerations be put aside in favour of the economy:  
Mark – Meanwhile, and before, while it was still being debated, I remember it 
went to city council, and city council had to approve going to close off McGill 
College and to sell it to the developer, or whatever they were going to do.  And I 
remember being at that city council meeting and being in the gallery, and I 
remember Jean Drapeau, Mayor Drapeau, saying ‘Don’t talk to me of urban 
planning when the unemployment rate is 10 percent.307 
 
A similar pattern was in effect: the building of a modernist structure with internal 
shopping would provide economic salvation.  Drapeau was not alone.  The provincial 
government, arguing the city needed an economic stimulus, was willing to contribute $30 
million towards the symphony hall portion of the project.308 
 Despite utilizing glass for the passageway, the plan was judged to “ne possède 
aucun aspect positif.”309 By erecting what was effectively a wall, the developer would 
further separate Montrealers from the mountain.  Opposition to this project was 
widespread, with community groups, property owners and the MCM lining up against the 
Cadillac Fairview’s proposal.310 The Comité de promotion économique de Montréal, 
representing the Montreal Board of Trade and Chambre de commerce argued that local 
property owners’ building plans were jeopardized by the city’s abandonment of the 
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original McGill College Avenue proposal.  The Comité de promotion économique 
considered the unilateral abandonment of long-standing plans and abuse of 
expropriation powers to be arbitrary changes to the “rules of development” and damaged 
the city’s reputation.311 Furthermore, closing a prominent intersection would cause 
circulation problems that would negatively impact Rue Ste-Catherine businesses.  Once 
again, the absence of a municipal plan charting future development was highlighted, 
albeit this time from a group representing private interests.312 
Since the fall of 1982, Save Montreal had opposed the widening of McGill 
College citing the loss of heritage buildings, pedestrian safety and the lack of need for a 
street of such width in the vicinity.313 Nonetheless, the demolitions occurred, primarily on 
the street’s west side.  Following Cadillac Fairview’s project announcement, the group 
began raising awareness and collecting petitions recommending the city alter the firm’s 
plans.314  
Mounting pressure resulted in the project’s deferral and the holding of public 
consultations throughout the summer of 1984.  These consultations were held by a 
collaborative body called the McGill College Area Urban Design Consulative Committee 
which produced a 160-page report that highlighted many of the criticisms of the site, 
while also recommending design changes.315  While Save Montreal agreed that 
aesthetic changes were needed, the group also wanted the project’s economic impact to 
be properly assessed: 
Josh – There were two parallel processes that have unfortunately been 
forgotten.  People in Save Montreal were concerned that blocking the view of the 
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mountain, were concerned with this private-public trading of property, but we 
were also concerned about the economic impact on St. Catherine Street.316 
 
However, the debates over McGill College involved many groups with varying interests.  
Save Montreal, no longer the lone voice, was unable to ensure these concerns were 
addressed. 
 Following the public consultation process Cadillac Fairview abandoned the glass 
passageway component of their proposal, while also reducing its proportions.  In lieu of 
a passageway, tunnels would connect the project to surrounding department stores and 
the metro system.  Otherwise, the proposal retained many of its original elements, 
including the symphony hall and tower.317 Furthermore, McGill College would be 
widened so as to cleave more closely to the original street plan.  By 1985, however, the 
project had morphed again.  Gone were the complex’s cultural elements with towers and 
additional shopping units taking their place.  However, set back from the street, the 
towers avoided spoiling views of Mount Royal.   
Reflecting upon what transpired, Josh lamented that the economic impact of 
these projects was ignored: 
Josh – And we were concerned, and part of the McGill College Avenue project, 
the Cadillac Fairview project, was to include a tunnel.  We were concerned about 
the impact on St. Catherine Street.  We said ‘There shouldn’t be…this will reduce 
the vitality of St. Catherine Street.’  And I think that is what happened.  I think 
that, and I remember speaking to someone in the municipal government who 
said ‘I’m not worried about that because the shops will evolve, the property 
owners will find uses for them.  It may not be the same stores, but it will still be a 
commercial street.’  Well, I think it declined in value, it declined in quality, and 
that’s unfortunate.  And I think part of that is the result of this underground 
tunnel.318 
 
Josh Wolfe’s disappointment stems from the continuing inability, or unwillingness, on the 
part of the city and developers to consider the city as a coherent whole.  Despite 
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architectural differences these complexes, by incorporating shopping concourses, 
mirrored the structures built in decades prior. Underground connections to buildings with 
mixed-commercial functions took residents off of the street.  Decades after Place Ville-
Marie had been constructed; the familiar patterns of form and function remained.319   
It is easy to understand the reasoning, the aesthetic argument is much easier to 
make, although aesthetics were compromised by the McGill College plan.  Jean-Claude 
Marsan, citing such streets as Ste-Catherine and St-Denis, argued that shops and 
sidewalk activity were the key ingredients to a vital street.320  McGill College, on the 
other hand, was “trop large par rapport à sa longer.  Ses trottoirs aussi sont trop vastes 
si l’on considère leur faible fréquentation: en dehors des heures de pointe et du lunch, ils 
paraissent désertes.”321  The avenue’s northern terminus misaligned with McGill’s 
Roddick Gates and its southern terminus coincided with a two-door parking garage while 
large office towers lined both its sides.  The result was an avenue lacking in human 
presence.  By forsaking street-level retail, the office complexes that lined McGill College 
produced a streetscape devoid of the elementals to a successful avenue.        
The McGill College campaign’s emphasis on the street was characteristic of the 
growing postmodern influence in civic affairs.  As Annick Germain and Damarais Rose 
note,  
in the 1980s, there was a renewed emphasis on city streets as structural spaces.  
The battle over McGill College Avenue became a turning point in this respect, 
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especially since it coincided with a new, postmodernist shift in Montreal 
architecture.322 
 
Congruity emerged between developers and citizens’ groups over the need for a master 
plan.  At least with regards to materials and design, the McGill College towers differed 
from the modernist architecture of previous decades, although their proportions 
remained massive.  The advent of public consultation was also encouraging, although it 
did not signify a move towards greater democratization in urban development.   
The withdrawal of federal funds for urban renewal projects required that city 
governments acquiesce to the wants and demands of private interests if development in 
central business districts was to take place, a circumstance that, according to Sharon 
Zukin, produces an “asymmetry of power favoring the private sector.”323 As a result 
The material landscape created by the joint efforts of speculative developers, 
elected officials, financial institutions, and architectural designers responds to 
these conditions by merging public places and private markets, often under the 
management of a quasi-public urban development corporation.  Significant public 
life moves inside from the streets.324 
 
   While people spoke of McGill College as Montreal’s potential Champs-Élysées, it 
instead became a streetscape dominated by corporate office towers and an interiorized 
space of consumption with direct links to the building that birthed Montreal’s 
underground consumer culture, Place Ville-Marie.  The street, eulogized by Jacobs and 
passionately defended by Save Montreal, was subverted by forms which, although 
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Would it make our conversation easier 
If these glass belfries remained parking lots? 
Abscesses from which one could surely recoil? 
Testaments to our modern bereavement. 
 
Each era the narrative reforms itself 
Within a constellation of corporate spires 
Accompanied by their bland asterims 
Still the standard quantifying method 
For divining our economic constitution 
 
As I saunter past these structures, 
Armed equally with aspiration and expectation 
I wonder to what degree am I complicit, 
If these measures sanction my staying or leaving? 
 
The McGill College confrontation was the final major campaign undertaken by 
Save Montreal.  Years of activism, performed in conjunction with full-time jobs, university 
studies and parenthood left many feeling burnt out.325 Furthermore, the acknowledged 
consensus amongst the interviewees was that by the early 1980s public enthusiasm for 
mega-projects had soured, indicative of a broader paradigm shift then underway. 
Montreal’s hosting of the 1976 Olympic Games proved to be financially ruinous to the 
city.  Mayor Drapeau imagined “that a glamorous, exciting Olympics would once again 
put French Canada at centre stage in the world and help attract large-scale foreign 
investment, particularly from Europe.”326 The staggering costs of the games, and 
especially the towering concrete Olympic Stadium, left many Montrealers disillusioned 
with large-scale development.327 Empty lots, cleared for developers, existed as physical 
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manifestations of the city’s thwarted ambitions.328 Simmering dissatisfaction with 
Drapeau and his Civic Party culminated in electoral success for the MCM, ending almost 
three decades of uninterrupted single-party governance.329  The MCM’s victory stemmed 
from “the electorate’s desire for an administration able to pay real attention to the 
constraints imposed on their daily life”.330 
 The public was not alone in their growing disavowal for large-scale urban 
redevelopment; a similar repudiation was transpiring at the governmental level.  While 
the continental recession of the early 1980s forestalled developments in many urban 
centres, governing authorities demonstrated a growing disinclination for statist economic 
intervention reflecting what political scientist François Rocher considers “the neo-liberal 
turn of the state throughout Quebec society”.331 While many western nations were 
repealing elements of the welfare state, what made Quebec notable in this regard was 
the previous affiliation between the state and Francophone nationalist aspirations.  One 
major reason for this change was the economic and social ascendancy of the province’s 
Francophone majority.332  The modernization initiatives of the Quiet Revolution coupled 
with the French-incentivising language legislation of the 1970s had, by 1985, eliminated 
previous wage disparities between the province’s linguistic groups.333 The emergent 
French-Canadian business class was more economically integrationist in mindset, 
especially with regards to the growing issue of free trade.     
 Municipal programs mirrored the province’s disengagement in their abandonment 
of large-scale development projects.  The launching of the ’10,000 logements’ program 
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by the city in 1979 (to be followed by the ’20,000 logements’ program) indicated a 
planning about-face on the part of city council.  The program prompted home 
construction, mainly throughout Sud-Ouest neighbourhoods strongly affected by the 
area’s loss of manufacturing.334 Newly-created agencies such as the Programme 
général d’interventions dans les quartiers anciens (PIQA), Sociétés d'initiative des 
artères commerciales (SIDAC) and Commission d’initiative et de développement 
économique de Montréal (CIDEM) intended to revitalize neighbourhoods and their 
commercial arteries.335          
 In their attempt to repair the urban fabric, these programs differed greatly from 
the high-modernist forms previously favoured by the municipal authorities.  While the 
contrast might appear stark, there was nonetheless precedent for these programs.  As 
noted in Chapter Two, since 1972 the city government’s programme détaillé de 
rénovation initiated home construction and renovation in lower-income neighbourhoods.  
While substantial redevelopment was occurring in the city centre, residential areas were 
undergoing less intrusive, or even restorative, proposals.  The differences in planning 
approaches suggest high-modernist principles were not comprehensively applied.  
Historian Tina Loo’s recent critique of James Scott’s high-modernist theory contends that 
rather than displacing local knowledge urban planners and engineers often undertook an 
“intense engagement” with their surroundings “which resulted in an understanding of it 
that was in part embodied, embedded in the particular, and characterized by an 
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acceptance of its limits.”336 While Drapeau was actively pursuing his vision of a modern 
city throughout downtown Montreal, civic bureaucrats were displaying a more nuanced 
view towards urban planning throughout other areas of the city.  Even in the city core, 
though, by the 1970s high-modernist principles could not be applied without opposition. 
 The very existence of Save Montreal and other grassroots organizations attests 
to a civic engagement often absent in the execution of high-modernist planning.  
According to Scott, one of the four principles in the successful application of high-
modernist principles is “a prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these 
plans.”337  While the city undoubtedly suffered from a lack of democratic accountability in 
its electoral and political systems, residents were far from prostrate.  Save Montreal’s 
ongoing ability to contest projects and win concessions, testified to the fact that a 
segment of civil society was able to counter the city’s guiding planning principles. 
 Montreal’s abandonment of high-modernism coincided with the gradual dimming 
of Save Montreal’s role in civic affairs.  Economic downturns and the disillusionment with 
statist approaches to city building resulted in less developmental pressure and a decline 
in demolitions.  Within this context, one can best understand the rise to prominence of 
Heritage Montreal throughout the 1980s.  
 Created by Phyllis Lambert in 1975 to be a funding arm for Save Montreal and 
other organizations, Heritage Montreal evolved to become an independent body with a 
distinct, yet overlapping, membership with its own activities.  In contrast to the more 
confrontational activism employed by Save Montreal, Heritage Montreal operated behind 
the scenes, establishing contacts within business and government circles, and parlaying 
those contacts into funding.  Greater funding allowed Heritage Montreal to host a series 
of home renovation courses where owners of heritage houses could learn how to 
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perform basic restoration.  Accompanying home renovation publications were also made 
available to the general public.                      
In look and in structure, Heritage Montreal differed from the organization it was 
intended to compliment.  Save Montreal operated as a non-hierarchial organization 
without ranks or paid positions.338 While strategies and information were shared, 
campaign work was disbursed so as to maximize effect.  Every member of the 
organization could speak on its behalf.  Campaigns were run effectively on shoestring 
budgets; the result of activist know-how honed over years.  In contrast, Heritage 
Montreal hired paid staff, opened a storefront in 1981, and assumed an executive 
structure.339  By the late 1980s, Save Montreal’s primary role was awarding the annual 
Oranges and Lemons Prizes, distributed to buildings that either harmonized with or 
maimed the existing streetscape.340   
In discussing the decline of Save Montreal and the rise of Heritage Montreal, the 
interviewees had mixed feelings.  Some Save Montrealers were members of both 
groups, or transitioned to Heritage Montreal.  A few even assumed prominent positions 
within the Heritage Montreal organization, including executive-director.  In these 
instances, it was felt that the changed landscape effectuated a change in tactics and 
outlook.  Government funding for co-operative renovations, an increase in heritage 
designations throughout Save Montreal’s existence,341 and the election of the MCM 
communicated to many individuals that the era of mass demolitions had passed.  Urban 
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conservation also experienced a degree of institutionalization during this time.342  
Members of Save Montreal also found themselves in paid positions that promoted 
conservation such as Mark London taking a position with the city’s urban planning 
department or Julia Gersovitz founding her own architectural conservation firm.343  
For others, the loss of Save Montreal weakened the urban conservation movement, as 
they felt that no organization fulfilled the activist role Save Montreal had assumed for so 
many years.  One interviewee described the relationship between the two organizations 
as that of “good cop/bad cop” with Save Montreal fulfilling the role of “bad cop”, willing to 
challenge developments in a more brazen fashion.  Others worried Heritage Montreal 
was too intimate with the business community diminishing the organization’s 
effectiveness and ability to criticize proposed developments.  Concerns for the state of 
the urban conservation movement were also shaped by demolitions reminiscent of the 
Drapeau era, overseen by a party that had promised to transform the manner by which 
politics and planning was conducted in the city.   
While ushering in positive policy and administrative changes, the MCM 
nonetheless, in the eyes of many, floundered on key conservation cases.  In 1987, 
private developers evicted tenants from their homes on the Overdale lot at the corner of 
Boulevard René-Lévesque and Rue Lucien-L’Allier.  Armed with a demolition permit 
supplied by the Doré administration, despite protests and petitions, they demolished the 
existing Victorian homes for a proposed two-tower condominium project, a project that 
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was never realized.344 The following year city council condemned the historic Queen’s 
Hotel on Rue Peel at Rue St-Jacques for a similar two-tower project that also went 
unrealized.345  Until the recent excavations at the Overdale, both sites remained as 
empty lots for over twenty-five years.346   
During the 1986 electoral campaign, the MCM had benefitted from the 
endorsement of local activists and left-wing organizations.  However, subsequent actions 
taken by the party disillusioned many supporters.  Activists who had tirelessly fought the 
development policies of the previous administration found the party was “committing the 
same crucial errors in judgement which had allowed them to replace the Drapeau 
administration.”347 The loss of the Overdale homes and the Queen’s Hotel confirmed, for 
many, that the MCM had abandoned its roots.  Despite the ejection of the Civic Party 
from power, the demolition of homes and heritage structures, while curtailed, remained 
an ongoing concern and reality for the city’s residents. 
Unfortunately, in the face of renewed development in Montreal’s downtown area - 
the same arena so hotly contested in years past – the parameters of urban conservation 
endures as a point of discussion.  Despite the passage of time and legislation, the 
delicate balance between growth and conservation remains an issue that Montreal – its 
city council, businesses and residents – is still grappling with.  In order to illustrate this, 
we can return to the crossroads that first beget Save Montreal as an organization. 
 At the southwest corner of Stanley and Sherbrooke Streets, diagonal from the 
site once occupied by the Van Horne mansion, stands the Maison Alcan complex, a 
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project conceived by former Alcan CEO, and long-time Montreal resident, David Culver.  
As both a child living in the Square Mile and as an adult residing in Westmount, Culver 
would always walk to work along Sherbrooke Street.348 Those walks provided him with 
ample evidence of the redevelopment of Montreal’s built landscape and the apparent 
disregard for the city’s history and architecture, something which appalled Culver.349 
With a lease expiration approaching, Culver sought a new space for the Alcan 
headquarters along Sherbrooke, one that would, amidst ongoing corporate 
decampment, affirm the company’s commitment to the city while also serving “as a 
catalyst for the further protection and restoration of the glory of Sherbrooke Street, which 
had been maimed over the years by out-of-control demolition.”350 
 Having quietly amassed a row of heritage structures, Culver hired Ray Affleck, 
architect behind Expo 67’s Canada Pavilion and Place Bonaventure, to fulfill his vision of 
erecting an “unobtrusive jewel” along the street he so adored.  According to Norbert 
Schoenauer the “complex demonstrates the viability of a moderate profile – rather than 
high-rise – office building that is neither in conflict with the scale of old buildings nor with 
the functional demands expected by corporate clients.”351 The sleek, yet restrained, 
modern addition, sheathed in Quebec-mined aluminum, paid deference to the buildings 
already existing on the site.  A light-filled atrium, co-designed by Peter Lanken, provided 
a space for an aesthetic interplay between architectural materials.  The height and 
dimensions of the complex complimented the existing scale of the block ensuring the 
heritage elements were not overshadowed.  Major interior restorations of the existing 
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heritage buildings were performed by Julia Gersovitz.  The results drew high praise, 
including the Prix d’Excellence from Quebec’s Order of Architects in 1984.352 
 The building is, both intentionally and unintentionally, representative of a spatial, 
architectural and social disassociation from the urban developments of the preceding 
three decades.  Formally situated in Place Ville-Marie, the pioneering structure that 
shaped so much of the development that was to follow, Alcan decamped for an office 
that, structurally and aesthetically, rejected the trends of the time.  The building 
eschewed the megastructure and instead employed an economy of scale that respected 
surrounding streetscapes.  Existing heritage structures were utilized as aesthetic 
advantages, not as impediments to a modernist vision.  The courtyards and atrium were 
designed as spaces for congregation.353 For its incorporation of existing structures, 
respect for scale and surroundings, and creation of public space the complex, 
consciously or not, subscribed to many of the tenets of Save Montreal.  The complex 
demonstrated, categorically, that it was possible to marry development and 
conservation.  Furthermore, its location, sitting diagonal from the Van Horne site, imbued 
the complex with additional significance, the type that, when combined with its other 
attributes, would stir present-day Montreal residents, this author among them. 
 On July 20, 2015, upon arriving to work, my colleagues and I were shocked to 
discover, care of an article in the Montreal Gazette, that a plan to demolish portions of 
the Maison Alcan and an adjoining heritage building in order to erect a 20-storey office 
tower, had been approved by the Ville-Marie Borough.  The Gazette article informed us 
that the public consultation had already transpired.  No one had attended which was 
understood to be due to the fact that notice of the consultation was given only in Le 
Devoir and on the borough website under the generic title “avis publique”, and that the 
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consultation took place on June 25th, the day following the Fête Nationale holiday.  We 
were further informed that the day on which the article was published was also the 
deadline for submitting a petition against the proposed development.354   
The petition only required twelve signatures but all signatures had to be collected from a 
landowner or primary tenant within a defined zone.  There were many zones within a 
larger area, some of which were only one block in size.  The zones were identified upon 
the map of Montreal; however the map resembled a gerrymandered electoral map with 
commercial areas south of Sherbrooke represented but none of the residential areas 
immediately to the north.  In addition, efforts to identify each zone were hindered by the 
illegibility of the map.  Even if we had been able to collect signatures from primary 
tenants and landowners of commercial buildings within one given zone, we would have 
been unable to read the zone numbers due to the poor quality of the map which had 
been buried on the website.  Needless to say, our efforts to collect signatures were 
unsuccessful. 
In response to what appeared as surreptitious methods on the borough’s part, 
my colleagues and I wrote a couple of opinion pieces that were carried by the Gazette 
which was followed by interviews for the paper and Radio-Canada.  At the same time, 
respected figures such as Raphaël Fischler and Adrian Sheppard were also explaining 
the importance of the Maison Alcan site and how the proposed design deviated too far 
from the site’s original concept.355  Initial opposition to the project prompted an opinion 
piece from Mayor Coderre and city councillor Richard Bergeron.  In the letter they stated 
that “for some 20 years, from 1992 to 2012, nothing was happening downtown, with its 
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vast vacant lots and street-level parking lots looking like a bombed out strip.”356 Now, 
with numerous construction projects underway, they argued that elected officials should 
not “hamper this economic revival of Montreal”.357 The banal, yet relentless logic that 
economic revitalization required redevelopment of the urban core, an argument used so 
frequently by past administrations, was deployed once again.   
However, many opinions were unmoved by this argument.  Letters and articles 
continued unabated in the press with many local intellectuals of significant heft lending 
their voice to opposing the project.  This relentless opposition prompted the city to delay 
holding a final vote on the project.  The provincial Ministry of Culture, while aware of the 
proceedings, had not yet waded into the fray.  Any changes to the complex required the 
ministry’s approval since the site fell within a 500 foot radius of the Mount Royal Club, a 
provincially designated structure.358  However, given the chorus of opposition to the 
project, Hélène David, the Minister of Culture, announced that the entire complex would 
be classified as a provincial monument.359  While this designation does not prevent 
demolition, it places greater constraints on future development, and further necessitates 
provincial approval, not to mention bestowing the site with greater recognition and 
ensuring that future proposals would garner public scrutiny. 
 The recent threat to the Maison Alcan reveals a lingering pattern regarding 
development in this city, a pattern that Montreal residents have been routinely 
contesting.  For over a decade Save Montreal operated as one of the principle 
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articulations of local opposition to the redevelopment of the city centre.  Important 
lessons regarding urban planning have been gleaned from the public dialogue to which 
they contributed.  Nonetheless, new developments retain an allure that continues to 
transfix many civic leaders.  Office and condo towers remain the barometers by which to 
measure the economic health of a city.  As a result public consultation operates more as 
a formality than guiding spirit.  Critics of the brazen manner by which such consultation 
takes place are treated as little more than a nuisance.  Despite the passage of time, the 
city centre, the geographical milieu in which Save Montreal was most active, remains 
vulnerable to private interests and politicians all too eager to sacrifice the city of today for 
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